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I. INTRODUCTION
Social institutions, such as stock markets, have conventional,
widely understood meanings. For example, people think they know
what the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)1 means. More gener-
ally, people have understandings about the roles institutions play
within their social, economic, and political contexts. “Just so stories”2
about these roles provide legitimacy, form the basis for education, and
guide regulation. So, for example, much of U.S. corporation law and
finance is taught and understood on the basis of the importance of
public equity markets in the fostering of the entrepreneur and thus
our economic and even social progress. Under the pressure of develop-
ments, however, such understandings of how an institution fits—what
an institution means to its society—may come to seem less plausible.
Just so stories may no longer seem “just so.”
1. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) is a stock index introduced by Charles
H. Dow, cofounder of Dow Jones & Company, in 1896. The Dow and the S&P 500:
Where It All Began, INDEXOLOGY [hereinafter Where It All Began], http://us.sp
indices.com/indexology/djia-and-sp-500/the-dow-and-the-sp-500-where-it-all-be-
gan [https://perma.unl.edu/26UM-KR9F]. The Average includes thirty component
companies that are major factors in their industries and are widely held and
traded by investors. See id. Approximately two-thirds of the DJIA component
companies are manufacturers of industrial and consumer goods, although the
DJIA also includes banking, financial services, and telecommunication compa-
nies. See Dow Jones INDU Average Index, CNN MONEY, http://money.cnn.com/
data/dow30 [https://perma.unl.edu/7LDM-LPYJ]. The stated purpose of the DJIA
is to provide a convenient benchmark to signal the market’s direction and to en-
able investors to compare individual stock and other economic indicators with the
market itself. See Where It All Began, supra. The DJIA is owned by S&P Dow
Jones Indices, a division of S&P Global. Id.
2. RUDYARD KIPLING, JUST SO STORIES FOR LITTLE CHILDREN (Pocket ed. 1909),
https://ia902606.us.archive.org/7/items/justsostoriesfo01kiplgoog/justsostoriesfo
01kiplgoog.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/JC88-6XXQ] (chronicling how and why dif-
ferent animals developed their distinctive features).
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This Article argues that developments in the private and public
equity markets are changing the role these markets play in the United
States and concurrently what “stock market” means as a matter of
political economy. For several generations, a broad middle class in-
vested directly in bureaucratically run corporations that were disci-
plined by securities and other laws. The governance of firms and thus
much of the economy was answerable to this broad middle class. Per-
haps most importantly, citizens understood their investments and the
markets as their own, thinking of them as “the free enterprise system”
or even “the American way.” The establishment of this “republican
capitalism” is discussed in Part II.
The turn of the century, however, revealed a decisive shift away
from broad-based ownership of publicly traded companies: Republican
capitalism appears to be waning. Ownership of U.S. firms, and so a
great deal of the economy, has shifted into the hands of very few peo-
ple.3 Consequently, Americans now speak of “the one percent,” and
populist anger over the economy has flared across the political
spectrum.4
Concentration of ownership interests can be observed in both pri-
vate and public equity markets. For reasons of economic practicality
and legal regulation, relatively few people are qualified to participate
in private equity markets. At the same time, private equity is increas-
ingly the preferred method of capital formation. The rising importance
of private equity markets is epitomized by the emergence of whimsi-
cally dubbed “unicorn” firms valued at over one billion dollars without
being publicly traded. Private equity markets are discussed in Part
III.
Part IV of this Article discusses public equity markets, which are
increasingly dominated by institutional investors with billions, and in
some cases trillions, of dollars under management. Such sums are un-
wieldy, and more and more capital is placed in passively managed in-
dex funds rather than actively managed. By design, index funds
require little human input and therefore minimal staff. As a result, a
small number of people controls substantial portions of the public eq-
uity markets.
This Article concludes by noting that the governance of U.S. firms
is now largely a matter of grace. We must hope that those who man-
age funds make good decisions about the allocation of capital, the gov-
ernance of firms, and the preservation of portfolio value on which
individuals and institutions rely. We call the people who make such
3. See infra section III.C.
4. For example, the 2016 Presidential-election primaries were marked by populist
anger over the economy. Mara Liasson, How This Election’s Populist Politics Are
Bigger than Trump and Sanders (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/04/25/
475551861/populist-candidates-appeal-to-voters-who-feel-theyre-unheard.
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decisions “guardians.” What this might mean for the vast majority of
citizens who are not involved is left to the judgment of the reader.
The basic developments at issue here, and even many of the likely
causes, are relatively familiar. The rise of private equity markets,
highlighted by the sudden plethora of unicorns, is no secret. Nor is it a
secret that public markets are dominated by institutional investors
entrusted with the welfare of countless individuals and socially crucial
organizations; such investors perforce have assumed the role of guard-
ians in the market. The reasons behind these developments include
the increasing inequality of asset ownership in the United States, the
shift from defined benefit to defined contribution retirement plans,
and the efforts of many institutions to operate as funds. Yet tying such
developments together is difficult.
As is often the case, a look backward can help bring the present
into focus. Adoph Berle and Gardiner Means’s 1932 classic The Mod-
ern Corporation and Private Property5 is often remembered for charac-
terizing the institution of the corporation by the separation of
ownership (the shareholders) from control (the managers).6 In this
view, shareholders are numerous, dispersed, and relatively powerless,
while managers are few and powerful. A major function of corporation
law, and particularly the structure of fiduciary duties, is to prevent
managers from taking advantage of shareholders without unduly com-
promising the ability of managers to use pooled capital for business
5. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRI-
VATE PROPERTY (rev. ed. 1991). For a discussion of fiduciary duty and how it has
evolved along with financial innovation, see Frank Partnoy, Financial Innovation
in Corporate Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 799, 801–04 (2006) (demonstrating that finan-
cial innovations had a strong impact on corporation law in the preceding two de-
cades); see also William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the
Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737 (2001) (concluding that Berle and Means’s
understanding of fiduciary standards as a primary concern in corporate govern-
ance has played a critical role in shaping corporate-fiduciary law).
6. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 119–20 (“In discussing problems of enterprise it
is possible to distinguish between three functions: that of having interests in an
enterprise, that of having power over it, and that of acting with respect to it. . . .
Before the industrial revolution the owner-worker performed all three, as do most
farmers today. But during the nineteenth centry [sic] the bulk of industrial pro-
duction came to be carried on by enterprises in which a division had occurred, the
owner fulfilling the first two functions while the latter was in large measure per-
formed by a separate group, the hired managers. Under such a system of produc-
tion, the owners were distinguished primarily by the fact that they were in a
position both to manage an enterprise or delegate its management and to receive
any profits which might accrue. The managers on the other hand were distin-
guished primarily by the fact that they operated an enterprise, presumably in the
interests of the owners. . . . Under the corporate system, the second  function,
that of having power over an enterprise, has become separated from the first. The
position of the owner has been reduced to that of having a set of legal and factual
interests in the enterprise while the group which we have called control, are in a
position of having legal and factual powers over it.”).
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purposes. Such purposes might include, for example, the construction
of factories, the founding of airlines and similarly capital-intensive en-
terprises, and other projects beyond the capacity of the individuals in-
volved to self-finance.7 As discussed infra, securities law served the
same ends, although in different ways.8
During the twentieth century, corporation and securities laws were
seen as supporting the strengths and offsetting the vulnerabilities of
corporations as institutions.9 But—and this is often forgotten—Berle
and Means were not solely concerned with the institution of the corpo-
ration for its own sake. Berle and Means worried that the corporate
form was the vehicle through which the few, managers of the predomi-
nant firms, would undermine the authority of the many, middle-class
shareholders. Corporation law gives managers direct control over the
assets and operations of the company. Conversely, individual share-
holders have little power of their own and generally are dispersed, so
having little capacity to organize. Therefore, Berle and Means argued,
managers are free to operate businesses in the interest of manage-
ment, effectively unopposed by shareholders. The corporation was
thus the institutional mechanism through which managers could, un-
less constrained by law, concentrate wealth and power in their own
hands and become oligarchs, “princes of industry.”10 Broad-based,
middle-class republican capitalism would come to its end.
While Berle and Means were worried about the republican conse-
quences of dispersed capital and concentrated management, in recent
years, both capital and management have become concentrated. Pri-
vate equity markets are, by legal definition, not popular, and in many
cases one must even qualify, perhaps as an accredited investor, to par-
ticipate.11 In a country of over 320 million people,12 there are a large
7. See DAVID A. WESTBROOK, BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
CORPORATION 63–66 (2007) [hereinafter BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE]; see also
Amy Deen Westbrook, Does the Buck Stop Here? Board Responsibility for FCPA
Compliance, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 493 (2017) [hereinafter Does the Buck Stop Here?]
(examining ways in which the corporate structure and fiduciary duties fail to en-
sure that managers operate corporations for the ultimate benefit of the share-
holders in the context of compliance with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
8. See infra section II.C.
9. Bratton, supra note 5, at 739–40.
10. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 2. Berle and Means famously wrote, “In its new
aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumerable individuals
has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby control over this wealth
has been surrendered to a unified direction. The power attendant upon such con-
centration has brought forth princes of industry.” Id.
11. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016). As defined in Rule 501 of Regulation D under the
Securities Act of 1933, an accredited investor may be an institution, company,
organization, or natural person as long as he, she, or it meets certain minimum
financial requirements. Id. Of course, under SEC regulations, nonaccredited in-
vestors may invest in most offerings. However, the participation of nonaccredited
investors may make one of the principal exemptions from registration of securi-
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number of accredited investors, but demographically, they are a small
minority.13 At the same time, public equity markets are increasingly
dominated by giant institutional holdings, often across industries. The
public markets also do not rely on widespread individual public partic-
ipation. We no longer see the equity markets as instantiations of the
free-enterprise system or the American way. They now seem exclusive
and distant from the majority of Americans.
Berle and Means were trying to protect a relatively new and pro-
gressive understanding of capital markets and corporate governance.
Capitalism in the United States changed character in the first few de-
cades of the twentieth century.14 The late nineteenth century was the
era of “robber barons” or “titans”—men like J.P. Morgan or Andrew
ties under the Securities Act of 1933, Regulation D, unavailable. In particular,
private placements of securities under Rule 506 of Regulation D to “accredited
investors” do not trigger SEC registration requirements as a result of limits on
the total number of investors allowed. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016). Similarly,
institutional investors meeting the threshold value requirements (so-called quali-
fied institutional buyers) can take advantage of Rule 144A under the Securities
Act of 1933 and immediately resell privately placed securities, gaining valuable
liquidity that is normally not available. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2016). The idea of
minimum financial or net-worth tests to determine exemption from securities law
requirements that may be prohibitively burdensome to potential issuers is found
throughout the securities laws.
12. On January 1, 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated the U.S. population to be
324,309,805. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www
.census.gov/popclock (last visited Oct. 5, 2017) (select January 1, 2017, in “Select
a Date”).
13. In 2015, the SEC estimated that ten percent of U.S. households qualified as ac-
credited-investor households. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF
THE DEFINITION OF ACCREDITED INVESTOR 89 (2015) (stating that since 1982 when
the SEC established the $200,000 individual-income and $1 million net-worth
thresholds and 1988 when the SEC established the $300,000 joint-income thresh-
old, the number of U.S. households qualifying as accredited investors had in-
creased from approximately two percent of the population to over ten percent as a
result of inflation). In 2015, there were approximately 124.6 million households
in the United States. Number of Households in the U.S. from 1960 to 2016,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/183635/number-of-households-in-
the-us [https://perma.unl.edu/DB8D-R7BD]. Using the SEC’s ten percent esti-
mate, therefore, 12.46 million households were accredited-investor households in
2015. The number of actual accredited investors is even smaller given the fact
that in 2015 the average U.S. household consisted of 2.54 people. Number of Peo-
ple per Household in the United States from 1960 to 2016, STATISTA,  https://www
.statista.com/statistics/183648/average-size-of-households-in-the-us [https://per
ma.unl.edu/R26H-GFKG]. However, because some households include spouses
and some do not, the actual number of individual accredited investors is difficult
to estimate reliably.
14. See JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST
AND MONEY (1936); Jeffery D. Sachs, Twentieth Century Political Economy: A
Brief History of Global Capitalism, 15(4) OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 90–101
(1999).
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Carnegie.15 “Business” was dramatic and exciting—maybe even dan-
gerous. The middle of the twentieth century, in contrast, was the era
of The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit16 and the far blander culture of
Dale Carnegie.17 “Business” came to be seen as stultifying, the sort of
thing The Graduate18 should avoid like the plague—better to chase
dreams than invest in plastics or, worse, become “the organization
man.”19 In essence, “business” became synonymous with “the estab-
lishment”: boring, perhaps, but responsible, conventional, and republi-
can in several senses of the word.
Law generally, and securities law in particular, played an impor-
tant role in the shift from the capitalism of the robber barons to that of
The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit. Using legislation, we may date the
shift from the thought that corporate power needed federal reins,
early expressed in the Sherman Act of 1890,20 to the subtle institu-
tional niceties required by the Investment Company Act21 and the In-
vestment Advisers Act,22 both of 1940. And while the specifics are
endlessly debatable, the explicit intention and general effect of such
15. See, e.g., RON CHERNOW, HOUSE OF MORGAN (2010); RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE
LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. (2004); MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER
BARONS (1962); CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS: HOW ANDREW CARNEGIE,
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, JAY GOULD AND J.P. MORGAN INVENTED THE AMERICAN
SUPERECONOMY (2006).
16. SLOAN WILSON, THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT (1955). Wilson’s novel was
made into a film by 20th Century Fox starring Gregory Peck and released in
1956. See WILLIAM WHYTE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
17. Carnegie, born Dale Carnagey, published numerous books and booklets (given
out in Dale Carnegie Courses) dedicated to helping businesspersons enhance
communication and leadership skills. His first book, written with Joseph Berg
Esenwein, was The Art of Public Speaking, which instructed its readers about
how to speak confidently and effectively before an audience. J. BERG ESENWEIN &
DALE CARNAGEY, THE ART OF PUBLIC SPEAKING (1915). Carnegie is perhaps most
remembered for his 1936 book, How to Win Friends and Influence People, which
is one of the best-selling self-help books ever published. See DALE CARNEGIE, HOW
TO WIN FRIENDS AND INFLUENCE PEOPLE (1937).
18. CHARLES WEBB, THE GRADUATE (1963). The novel was made into a 1967 film star-
ring Dustin Hoffman and Anne Bancroft, and directed by Mike Nichols.
19. Whyte explained “the organization man” as follows:
They are not the workers, nor are they the white-collar people in the
usual clerk sense of the word. These people only work for The Organiza-
tion. The ones I am talking about belong to it as well. They are the ones
of our middle class who have left home, spiritually as well as physically,
to take the vows of organization life, and it is they who are the mind and
the soul of our great self-perpetuating institutions. Only a few are top
managers or ever will be. In a system that makes such hazy terminology
as “junior executive” psychologically necessary, they are of the staff as
much as the line, and most are destined to live poised in a middle area
that still awaits a satisfactory euphemism.
WHYTE, supra note 16, at 3.
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).
21. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2012).
22. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012).
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laws were to tame the “animal spirits” that roamed the financial
jungle.23
Most importantly for present purposes and as discussed below, the
Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act),24 the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (Exchange Act),25 and copious regulations thereunder (securi-
ties law) established a mandatory-disclosure regime for any company
that offered securities, paradigmatically common stock, to the public.
Such “publicly traded” firms simultaneously themselves became pub-
lic in a number of ways. Most directly, the companies had to disclose
information about themselves and their operations to the public at
large. In addition, business was integrated into the commercial repub-
lic through widespread investment. The stock market became the ba-
rometer of the nation’s economic health, its indices reported on the
nightly news, despite the fact that other financial markets were larger
and, in that sense, more important.
Public companies became public in another sense as well. An indi-
rect effect of the extensive disclosure regime established by securities
law was to transform publicly traded firms into bureaucracies. The
people who ran the firms, the barons, became corporate officials (i.e.,
bureaucrats). When transparency became the order of the day, firms
needed to regulate their processes, hire accountants, and think like
lawyers. Compliance with securities law thus required a Weberian
process of modernization26 and, indeed, disenchantment.27 The excite-
ment of the swashbuckling entrepreneur beloved by Schumpeter28
23. KEYNES, supra note 14, at 161–62. This intent may be seen in the preambles to
many of the landmark statutes passed during this era. For example, the pream-
ble to the Securities Act of 1933 describes the legislation as “An Act To provide
full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and
for other purposes.” Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, pmbl., 48 Stat. 74 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)). For a general discussion of the impor-
tance of popular trust in the financial system, as enabled by securities regulation,
in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis, see Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the
Reform of Securities Regulation, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829 (2010) (arguing that
trust is a key ingredient for a well-functioning securities market and, thus, for a
successful economy).
24. §§ 77a–77aa.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
26. See generally MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wit-
tich eds., 1968). For an analysis of Weber’s approach to bureaucratic organization
in modern capitalist society, see ANTHONY GIDDENS, CAPITALISM AND MODERN SO-
CIAL THEORY 158–60 (1971).
27. Compliance with U.S. securities laws is a full-time job for many in the legal pro-
fession as well as in the business world. The complexity of the regulations, com-
bined with the responsibilities of corporate executives and directors, continues to
increase in the wake of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
28. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY
(15th ed. 1976).
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gave way to corporate policy and to endless board meetings. In this
way, however, the vast power that corporations enjoyed was domesti-
cated and made answerable to legal and political institutions.
Over the last decade or so, however, something fundamental has
happened to the financing of U.S. firms, especially the technology-
based firms like Alphabet (Google),29 Facebook,30 Uber,31 and Tesla32
that receive the lion’s share of attention: their capital structures have
been transformed. Public offerings are not as necessary to building
large companies as they once were.33 New firms seem to require less,
or different kinds of, capital, and their capital needs can be met
through private arrangements. The value of private placements now
far outstrips that of public offerings.34 And, because the capital struc-
ture of private placements is, by definition, private, such firms are
able to avoid complying with the disclosure regime under which public
companies operate. By remaining privately held, firms avoid the pro-
cess of bureaucratization and may adopt idiosyncratic governance ar-
rangements. The Economist rather enthusiastically maintains that
the business corporation itself is being reinvented along more contrac-
tual, individualistic, and, in that sense, private lines.35 Eventually,
even tech firms such as Alphabet, Facebook, or Snap may offer securi-
29. See Larry Page, G is for Google, https://abc.xyz [https://perma.unl.edu/SDT6-
PMX6] (explaining that Google will become a wholly owned subsidiary of Al-
phabet, still trading on the NASDAQ as GOOGL and GOOG).
30. See Facebook Investor Relations, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook
investorrelavtions/?ref=page_internal [https://perma.unl.edu/K7NM-9SBJ].
Facebook trades on the NASDAQ as FB, but Mark Zuckerberg still controls the
company. See Erin Griffith, Mark Zuckerberg Controls Facebook and He Intends
to Keep It That Way, FORTUNE (Apr. 27, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/27/
zuckerberg-facebook-control [https://perma.unl.edu/3S9Z-QZGC] (calling
Facebook a “controlled company”).
31. See, e.g., Adam Satariano, No Uber IPO in Sight After $3.5 Billion in Saudi Ara-
bia, L.V. REV. J. (June 3, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/no-uber-
ipo-in-sight-after-3-5-billion-from-saudi-arabia [https://perma.unl.edu/GD3H-
X8L6] (quoting then-Uber CEO Travis Kalanick asserting “I’m going to make
sure [listing of Uber] happens as late as possible” and noting that IPOs are cur-
rently less attractive to company founders).
32. Tesla Motors Inc. trades on the NASDAQ as TSLA. Nevertheless, Elon Musk
owns 22.5% of the company’s common stock. Marco Papa, Who Are the Top 4
Tesla (TSLA) Shareholders?, TESLARATI, (May 31, 2016), http://www.teslarati
.com/tsla-top-shareholders [https://perma.unl.edu/D7YB-EEGT] (identifying the
top four stockholders of Tesla as Elon Musk, Antonio J. Gracias, Kimbal Musk,
and Jeffrey B. Straubel).
33. See MICHAEL R. FLYNN, ADJUSTING TO INVESTMENT TRENDS IN A NEW VENTURE
CAPITAL MARKET *1 (2013), Westlaw 2013 WL 574518 (discussing “the near-total
death of the IPO market in all sectors except for life sciences”).
34. Geoff Colvin, Private Desires, FORTUNE, June 1, 2016, at 52 (making up one of
several features in an issue entitled “So Long, Wall Street”).
35. Reinventing the Company, ECONOMIST (Oct. 24, 2015), http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21676767-entrepreneurs-are-redesigning-basic-building-block-capi-
talism-reinventing-company [https://perma.unl.edu/2QQK-LWBZ].
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ties to the public. But public offerings come much later in the life of
the company, or not at all, and often carry minimal voting rights, leav-
ing effective power in the hands of the company founders.
Such fundamental shifts in the way business is financed have con-
sequences for political economy. While financiers must presumably be
satisfied with the information provided to consummate the transac-
tion, the financier—the term “private equity”36 is unavoidable—need
not comply with a mandatory-disclosure regime and therefore need
not be particularly answerable to the public.37 Thus, we seem to be
observing a shift from more public forms of ownership to more private
forms,38 from The Modern Corporation and Private Property39 to the
essentially private corporation as modern property. Bluntly, the ca-
pacity of securities law to foster republican U.S. equity markets has
been undermined by the rise of private equity.
None of which is to say that the publicly traded corporation has
disappeared from the scene or is likely to. Old-fashioned publicly
traded corporations still dominate the economic landscape and per-
haps the imagination.40 However, it is unclear how public the so-
36. For a critical discussion of private equity, see, for example, Lee Harris, A Critical
Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 259, 260 (2010) (noting that private
equity funds raise billions of dollars and invest in a wide range of companies);
James C. Spindler, How Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?, 76 U. CHI.
L. REV. 311, 320–21 (2009) (characterizing private-equity-fund structures as at-
tempts to escape the reach of the securities laws); The New Kings of Capitalism,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 27, 2004, at 1.
37. Lack of public disclosure does, however, seem to create opportunities for invest-
ment to proceed on inadequate information. Consider, for example, the current
litigation against Theranos, Inc., the so-called blood unicorn, which has faced
lawsuits by its ex-partner Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., consumers, its inves-
tors, and the State of Arizona, as well as sanctions by U.S. regulators and investi-
gations by both the SEC and the DOJ, all relating to Theranos’s false statements
about the accuracy of its blood-testing products. See, e.g., Colman v. Theranos,
Inc., No. 5:16-cv-06822 (N.D. Cal. filed Nov. 28, 2016); In re Theranos, Inc. Con-
sumer Litig., No. 4:16-cv-02810 (N.D. Cal. dismissed Oct. 28, 2016); see also Maya
Kosoff, Theranos’s Latest Lawsuit May Be Its Worst Yet, VANITY FAIR HIVE (Jan.
12, 2017), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/01/theranoss-latest-lawsuit-
may-be-its-worst-yet [http://perma.unl.edu/TEY2-PZJ5] (summarizing lawsuits
against Theranos, Inc., including a recent suit filed by the Arizona Attorney
General).
38. Matt Krantz, Investors Face a Shrinking Stock Supply, USA TODAY (Mar. 17,
2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/personalfinance/2013/03/17/public-
companies-vanishing-fewer-stocks/1920681 [https://perma.unl.edu/8YWQ-XQPU]
(noting the shrinking number of public companies).
39. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5.
40. In September 2016, the market capitalization of the companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange was over $19.5 trillion. NYSE Group Shares Outstanding
and Market Capitalization of Companies Listed, 2016, N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE,
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=tables
&key=333&category=5 [https://perma.unl.edu/9HCG-XTKJ]. On September 30,
2016, the NASDAQ total market capitalization was $11.16 billion. NASDAQ
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called public markets really are. The amount of money under manage-
ment and rising inequality in the United States mean that few actors,
certainly nothing akin to a broad middle class, directly participate in
the publicly traded equity markets. Indeed, the concentration of own-
ership under institutional investors may be even greater than it was
under the robber barons.41
This Article tries to describe some of the ways such fundamental
changes appear to have come to pass and some of the roles the law has
played in liberating those same animal spirits that it once sought to
tame. This Article thus tells a return to a Gilded Age story42 in line
with widespread concerns about the rise of inequality in the United
States and the concomitant decline in the republican nature of the pol-
ity. As noted above, it would be odd if law did not participate in the
drift of the society in which it is embedded. So, it is unsurprising that
the construction of a new sort of Gilded Age can be told in terms of the
regulation of corporate finance.
II. THE REPUBLICAN EQUITY MARKET OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
A. Law as Response to Marketplace Power in the Late
Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries
During the late nineteenth century, the power of industrial capital-
ism to remake society and dominate lives was self-evident. Between
the end of the Civil War in 1864 and the beginning of World War I in
1914, the United States was transformed by a “Second Industrial
Revolution.”43 The urbanization and territorial expansion that had
taken place in the mid-nineteenth century created a massive demand
for industry to “tame the West,” including railroads to reach and tele-
Market Cap Chart, YCHARTS, https://ycharts.com/companies/NDAQ/market_cap
[https://perma.unl.edu/9VBR-VPL6]. The dominance of publicly traded compa-
nies continues despite the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, and 28 U.S.C). The Sarbanes–Oxley
Act imposed substantial regulations on publicly traded companies, and a number
of publicly traded companies went private following its passage. See William J.
Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes–Oxley: The Irony of “Going Pri-
vate”, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 148 (2006) (analyzing companies that filed Schedule
13E-3s to go private in 2004 and their citation of the cost of compliance with the
federal securities laws).
41. See infra section III.C.
42. Referring to the era of rapid growth following the Reconstruction in the United
States, the term “Gilded Age” is derived from an 1873 Mark Twain satire. MARK
TWAIN, THE GILDED AGE AND LATER NOVELS (Hamlin L. Hill ed., 2002).
43. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPI-
TALISM (1994).
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graph lines to communicate with the new territories.44 Often dated
from the establishment of the First Transcontinental Railroad in
1869, the period is also known as the Technology Revolution, as ad-
vances in machinery, manufacturing materials, electrification, and
communications transformed the American marketplace. It is esti-
mated that the U.S. economy grew by an annual rate of 2.4% between
1869 and 1909.45
Economic growth and urbanization were compounded by immigra-
tion46 and population growth. In 1870, the U.S. population was mea-
sured at 38,558,371. By 1910 it had risen to 92,228,496, and by 1920 it
had jumped to 106,021,537.47 Between 1870 and 1920, almost eleven
million Americans moved from farm to city, and another twenty-five
million immigrants arrived from overseas.48
Social transformations were accompanied by vast concentrations of
power in the hands of a few leading industrialists. In 1859, the New
York Times compared Cornelius Vanderbilt to the German robber
knights (Raubritter) of the Middle Ages, who exacted money in ex-
change for safe passage on roads and rivers.49 The image stuck as the
44. The classic starting point for such discussions is FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER,
THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (2d ed. 1947).
45. Robert E. Gallman, Economic Growth and Structural Change in the Long Nine-
teenth Century, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
THE LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY 1, 22 (Stanley L. Engerman  & Robert E.
Gallman eds., 2000). Industrial production experienced an almost five-fold expan-
sion of added value in manufacturing and mining from 1880 to 1915. Joseph P.
Davis, Index of Industrial Production, in 3 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED
STATES: EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT 3-23 to 3-25 (Susan B. Carter et al. eds.,
2006). Technological advances included: air brakes for railroads, the Bessemer,
and the open-hearth process in the steel mills; the telephone, the electric light,
the typewriter, the elevator, and structural steel for buildings; the phonograph,
motion pictures, the electric generator, and the internal combustion engine,
which led to the first cars and the Wright brothers’ first flight. Ryan Engelman,
The Second Industrial Revolution, 1870–1914, U.S. HISTORY SCENE (Apr. 10,
2015), http://ushistoryscene.com/article/second-industrial-revolution [https://per
ma.unl.edu/5MLN-4U9E].
46. Charles Hirschman & Elizabeth Mogford, Immigration and the American Indus-
trial Revolution from 1880–1920, NAT’L CTR. FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY INFO. (Dec. 1,
2009), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2760060 (noting that in
1900, about three quarters of the populations of many large cities, including New
York, Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, San Francisco, Buffalo, Milwaukee, and De-
troit, were composed of immigrants and their children).
47. History: Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/history/www/
through_the_decades/fast_facts [https://perma.unl.edu/HWZ9-NYHF] (last up-
dated July 11, 2017).
48. Engelman, supra note 45.
49. Henry J. Raymond, Your Money or Your Line, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1859, http://
query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9D02E1DB1E31EE34BC4153DFB
4668382649FDE&mcubz=3. (objecting to Vanderbilt’s decision to accept a large
monthly payment from the Pacific Mail Steamship Company in return for declin-
ing to compete on the sea lanes to California). The article states:
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new robber barons came to dominate the economy.50 Andrew Car-
negie, John D. Rockefeller, Jay Gould, and J.P. Morgan were called
“titans”51 and “bandits”52 for their aggressive business empires.53
The robber barons drew widespread criticism for their exploitation
of workers and their use of anticompetitive trusts to control large sec-
tors of the economy. For example, between 1902 and 1904, leading
“muckracker” journalist Ida Tarbell published “The History of the
Standard Oil Company” in serialized form in McClure’s magazine, vili-
fying Rockefeller as money-grubbing and brutally effective at mono-
polizing the oil trade.54 Wealth concentration at the turn of the
twentieth century was extreme: according to a study conducted by
G.K. Holmes in 1893, nine percent of American families possessed sev-
enty-one percent of the wealth of the country.55
In what came to be called the Progressive Era, lawmakers sought
to restrain the power of industrial capitalists, to keep individual
power within bounds appropriate to a nation that aspired to being
Like those old German barons who, from their eyries along the Rhine,
swooped down upon the commerce of the noble river and wrung tribute
from every passenger that floated by, Mr. Cornelius Vanderbilt . . . has
insisted that the Pacific Company should pay him toll, taken of all
America that had business with California and the Southern Sea, and
the Pacific Company have submitted to his demand.
Id.
50. The first use of the precise term “robber barons” is difficult to trace, but it was
cemented by Matthew Josephson’s The Robber Barons, which was published in
1934. See JOSEPHSON, supra note 15.
51. See RON CHERNOW, TITAN (1998) (chronicling the life of John D. Rockefeller, Sr.).
52. See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TYCOONS 60 (2005) (describing how Carnegie, Rock-
efeller, Gould, and Morgan invented the American supereconomy).
53. Gould, with his partner Jim Fisk, Jr., waged the so-called Erie Wars to take con-
trol of the Erie Railway, in a pattern that he would repeat many times to become
the nation’s dominant railroad manager. Id. at 60–71.  Of course, Gould’s reputa-
tion had suffered as a result of his effort to corner the gold market in 1869. Id. at
69–74. Rockefeller, on the other hand, made his way to becoming the most power-
ful figure in oil, organizing his businesses as the Standard Oil Co., a joint-stock
corporation with an impressive one-million-dollar capitalization by 1870. Id. at
61, 83. Carnegie, who had arrived in the United States with his family as a thir-
teen-year-old Scottish immigrant, built an iron and steel empire. Andrew Car-
negie’s Story, CARNEGIE CORP. N.Y., https://www.carnegie.org/interactives/found
ersstory/#! [https://perma.unl.edu/2SJE-SY2X]. Morgan created a financial and
investment entity that is a cornerstone of our economy to this day.
54. Ida Tarbell’s expose´ of Standard Oil Company was serialized in nineteen install-
ments by McClure’s magazine between 1902 and 1904 before being published in
book form. See IDA M. TARBELL, THE HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL CO. (1925).
55. C.J. Merwin, Jr., American Studies of the Distribution of Wealth and Income by
Size, in 3 STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH 2, 5–7 (1939) (citing G.K. Holmes, The
Concentration of Wealth, 8 POL. SCI. Q. 589 (1893)), http://www.nber.org/chap-
ters/c9521.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/BK4J-WV2H]. In 1892, the New York Trib-
une estimated that there were 4047 millionaires in the United States, leading
Holmes to deduce that those millionaire families, representing 0.03% of the popu-
lation, owned 20% of the nation’s wealth. Id.
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both a commercial republic and a republican democracy. The Progres-
sive movement sought to counteract monopolistic practices for which
the business-trust form was used.56 The Theodore Roosevelt adminis-
tration, and later both the Taft and Wilson administrations, spon-
sored this “trust-busting” legislation.57 For example, antitrust law,
principally the Sherman Act of 189058 as strengthened by the Clayton
Act of 1914,59 was established as an effort to restrain if not to prevent
the great trusts from exercising monopoly power. In turn, regulators
were charged to help enforce the Acts. Under Roosevelt, Congress es-
tablished the Bureau of Corporations in 1903, to be replaced in 1914
by the Federal Trade Commission. Protections for individual workers,
on the other hand, would have to wait a little longer for the War Labor
Board’s creation in 1918 and, finally, the passage of the Wagner Act in
1935.
Concomitant efforts to curb the power of the industrialists were
made in the realm of taxation. The Income Tax Act of 189460 and,
more decisively, the Income Tax Act of 191361 instituted a federal pro-
gressive income tax. Although the effect at the time was relatively
slight, progressive taxation was seen to be important—and had ulti-
mately required a constitutional amendment62—precisely because it
56. The business trust was similar to the corporation, although generally less regu-
lated. John Morley, The Common Law Corporation: The Power of the Trust in
Anglo-American Business History, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2145, 2164 (2010) (tracing
the rise of the business trust in Anglo-American history and explaining that the
business trust featured the primary attributes that organizers and investors
sought in a business form).
57. Many Progressives, including Roosevelt, used the business “trust” and the “corpo-
ration” interchangeably. Robert B. Shepherd, Jr., Note: What Roosevelt Thought:
A Rough Rider’s Guide to the USTEA, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L. J. 311, 313–14
(2010). Both Rockefeller’s Standard Oil and Morgan’s Northern Securities were
organized in trust form. Id. at 314 (citing N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S.
197 (1904)).
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012).  Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization,
attempts to monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize. § 2.
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27 (2012). Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and
acquisitions the effect of which “may be substantially to lessen competition . . . in
any line of commerce . . .  in any section of the country.” § 18.
60. Income Tax Act of 1894, Pub. L. No. 227, 28 Stat. 509. Although the United
States imposed income tax measures during the Civil War to finance its endeav-
ors, the first peacetime tax measure affecting individuals was the Income Tax Act
of 1894. See Timothy Hurley, Robbing the Rich to Give to the Poor: Abolishing
Realization and Adopting a Mark-to-Market Taxation, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
529, 535–36 (2008). The 1894 measure, however, was held to be unconstitutional
the next year. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583–84 (1895)
(holding that the Act was a direct tax on income and had to be apportioned among
the states according to their populations).
61. Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, 38 Stat. 114, 166.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI (“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes
on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”).
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addressed marketplace outcomes that were seen, at least if carried to
the extreme, as inimical to republican values. Progressive taxation,
with its ability to redistribute power, was another way for law to
counteract the market’s tendency to concentrate economic power in
the few.
B. Corporation Law and the Threat to the Republic
During the 1920s, after the First World War, industrialized capi-
talism conducted by large publicly traded corporations was firmly es-
tablished in the United States. Shares in firms such as Coca-Cola,
Archer Daniels Midland, Deere & Co., Standard Oil Company, and
U.S. Steel were publicly traded,63 and there were stock exchanges lo-
cated across the country, spanning New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. The new technology of the
telephone enabled investors from across the nation to participate in
the financial markets because instructions to buy and sell could be
transmitted from almost anywhere. Using the corporate form, busi-
nesses sought stockholders who entrusted their savings in and pinned
their hopes on their investments. Business boomed, stock prices
soared, and real GNP growth was estimated at 4.2% a year.64 Then, in
1929, the stock market crashed.65 Confidence was shaken in the
United States and around the world, and the Great Depression began.
Berle and Means wrote The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty in 1932, the year that Franklin Delano Roosevelt was elected. Al-
though the book is often remembered for articulating the separation
between ownership (meaning shareholders) and control (meaning
managers) of a corporation,66 such corporate-governance issues were
63. Patti Domm, The Stocks that Survived 1929, CNBC (Oct. 27, 2008), http://www
.cnbc.com/id/27404980 [https://perma.unl.edu/GZP4-G2M5].
64. Gene Smiley, The U.S. Economy in the 1920s, EH.NET, https://eh.net/encyclope-
dia/the-u-s-economy-in-the-1920s [https://perma.unl.edu/94ZA-3Y53].
65. The Stock Market Crash of 1929 ushered in the Great Depression of the 1930s, in
which “the nation was broken economically and the banking system was
wrecked.” See T.H. WATKINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AMERICA IN THE 1930S
(1993) (describing the loss of real GDP, unemployment, and wage cuts during
that era). By 1932, over twenty-five percent of U.S. banks had failed. JERRY W.
MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM J.P. MORGAN TO
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (1900–1970), at 161 (2002). Stockholders across the
country lost their investments. Jerry W. Markham, The Subprime Crisis—A Test
Match for the Bankers: Glass-Steagall vs. Gramm-Leach-Bliley, 12 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 1081, 1088–90 (2010) (explaining the decimation that followed the Stock Mar-
ket Crash in 1929). Investment-company shareholders, in particular, lost forty
percent of their investment between 1929 and 1936. Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv.
Mgmt., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at A Celebration of the 60th Anniver-
sary of the Investment Company Act (Oct. 4, 2000), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch405.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/9V4G-XGR8].
66. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 119–20.
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situated within larger questions about the governance of the nation.
By the early 1930s, when The Modern Corporation and Private Prop-
erty was written, the corporation had evolved from a vehicle enabled
by special state legislation to accomplish a specific public objective,67
to a general form with state statutory restrictions on the entity and its
managers,68 to an often very large entity governed by professional
managers with broad discretion. Berle and Means observed:
In its new aspect the corporation is a means whereby the wealth of innumera-
ble individuals has been concentrated into huge aggregates and whereby con-
trol over this wealth has been surrendered to a unified direction. The power
attendant upon such concentration has brought forth princes of industry,
whose position in the community is yet to be defined. The surrender of control
over their wealth by investors has effectively broken the old property relation-
ships and has raised the problem of defining these relationships anew. The
direction of industry by persons other than those who have ventured their
wealth has raised the question of the motive force back of such direction and
the effective distribution of the returns from business enterprise.69
Berle and Means described corporate powers as “Powers in Trust” and
argued that corporation law—elaborate fiduciary duties backed by ju-
dicial enforcement of shareholder rights—in principle could discipline
such powers. They recognized
the necessity of an underlying thesis in corporation law which could be ap-
plied to each and every power in the whole corporate galaxy. Succinctly
stated, the thesis appears to be that all powers granted to a corporation or to
the management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation,
whether derived from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all
times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all shareholders as their inter-
est appears.70
Suffice it to say that corporation law did not develop in this fash-
ion.71 States, led by Delaware, have generally taken a procedural, as
opposed to a substantive, approach to shareholder protection, with the
result that shareholders often have no effective judicial recourse.72
67. See E. Norman Veasey & Christine Di Guglielmo, History Informs American Cor-
porate Law: The Necessity of Maintaining a Delicate Balance in the Federal
Ecosystem, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201, 203–205 (2006) (providing a broad historical
overview of corporation law).
68. FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 19–20 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing the re-
strictive nature of New York’s first general-incorporation law).
69. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 4. For a good discussion of Berle and Means, see
Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Evolution of the Modern Corporation: Corporate Gov-
ernance Reform in Context, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1001 (tracing the evolution of the
corporation from the Civil War until the present).
70. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 5, at 248.
71. See BETWEEN CITIZEN AND STATE, supra note 7, at 32–40; Does the Buck Stop
Here?, supra note 7.
72. In the 1970s, in fact, Bayless Manning called corporation laws “towering sky-
scrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but
wind.” Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 (1962) (arguing that corporation law as a field
of intellectual effort was dead). For a strong challenge to the premise that Dela-
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The judiciary has proven consistently deferential to managers, nota-
bly through the elaboration of the business judgment rule, arguing
that robust judicial involvement in business might chill risk-taking
and thereby stifle the entrepreneurial spirit.73
C. Securities Law, Disclosure, and Bureaucratization
Discipline came from another quarter, the federal government. Se-
curities laws were passed to prevent fraud, broadly construed, and,
more globally, used to encourage the formation of broad and deep
pools of capital.74 But the mandatory-disclosure requirements and
broad antifraud remedies provided by the securities laws also had a
profound effect on the conduct of business.
In the United States, modern securities law began in the 1930s, in
response to the Crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.75 Through
the Securities Act76 and the Exchange Act,77 and a great deal of ad-
ministrative regulation and judicial decision under those laws, the
federal government required companies to provide information about
ware corporate law is dominant because it possesses superior traits, see William
J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (analyzing the weaknesses of the Delaware Gen-
eral Corporation Law in comparison to the Model Business Corporations Act).
73. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d
906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (declining to impose liability on corporate director). Ear-
lier examples of judicial deference include Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding that the business judgment rule protected a board deci-
sion to hire the wife of the company’s president). This concept is the cornerstone
of many state corporation laws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2016)
(making directors responsible for the business and affairs of a corporation).
74. The first comprehensive system for regulating the sale of securities was imposed
by the State of Kansas in 1911. An Act to Provide for the Regulation and Supervi-
sion of Investment Companies and Providing Penalties for the Violation Thereof,
1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210. Other states quickly followed the Kansas lead, and by
the time the federal government adopted similar legislation, forty-seven states
and the territory of Hawaii had imposed so-called blue sky securities laws. Rick
A. Fleming, 100 Years of Securities Law: Examining a Foundation Laid in the
Kansas Blue Sky, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 583 (2011) (clarifying the actual derivation
and meaning of the term “blue sky laws”); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P.
Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 377–380 (1992) (outlin-
ing the progression of states that copied and implemented laws similar to that
passed by Kansas).
75. See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 42 STAN. L. REV. 385, 408 (1990) (noting that the public, at least,
blamed the Stock Market Crash for the Great Depression, making substantial
legislation to regulate stock exchanges inevitable).
76. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77zz (2012)).
77. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
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themselves.78 Securities laws have become such an important part of
the business and financial landscape, especially in the United States,
that it is easy to overlook how strange a requirement disclosure is.
Most sellers would prefer not to provide extensive information about
themselves and do not regularly choose to update information they do
provide for the benefit of third parties.79 The information owned by
private parties is, generally speaking, private or “proprietary.” But
mandatory-disclosure regimes require publicly traded companies to
make massive filings with the government and to disclose the scope,
direction, and risks of their business not just to the government but to
the public at large.
Why did the United States create this mandatory-disclosure re-
gime in a financial market?80 The traditional answer is “to prevent
fraud,” which is not wrong. The stock market bubble and the resulting
Crash of 1929, which led to the Great Depression, were thought to be
caused by the fraudulent sales of securities and speculative invest-
ment (often with borrowed funds) based on inadequate or downright
untruthful information.81 So the securities laws may broadly be seen
as a response to fraud—to lying—by requiring good information—the
truth.82
78. Under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, issuers are required to make
periodic disclosures about their business and financial condition (Forms 10K,
10Q, 8K, etc.) guided by extensive requirements in Rules S-K and S-Q. The vol-
ume of this disclosure has spawned whole industries of supporting professionals
and is responsible for numerous law school classes.
79. There is evidence that, in at least some instances, sellers of securities want to
provide credible disclosure, which may raise share prices. See Rene´ Stulz, Securi-
ties Laws, Disclosure, and National Capital Markets in the Age of Financial
Globalization, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 349 (2009) (showing that there is a demand from
entrepreneurs for mechanisms that allow them to commit to credible disclosure
because disclosure helps reduce agency costs).
80. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61
BROOK. L. REV. 763 (1995) (examining the goals served by the disclosure that the
securities laws require).
81. See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (1954) (explaining that
the speculative stock market bubble of the 1920s and its collapse contributed sub-
stantially to the Great Depression). Of course, economists and others still argue
about what caused the crash, especially in the wake of subsequent crashes in
1987 and 2008.
82. The federal securities laws were enacted in the wake of the stock market crash of
1929. Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). In the debate over the Secur-
ities Act of 1933, Representative Sam Rayburn stated that the laws were in-
tended to “place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible, with the
management of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same plane so far
as available information is concerned, with the seller.” LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMEN-
TALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 32 (2d ed. 1988) (quoting 77 CONG. REC. 2918
(1933) (statement of Rep. Sam Rayburn)). A cornerstone of the antifraud effort is
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, which provides:
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Preventing fraud, however, does not suffice to explain the disclo-
sure regime actually established by securities law. Most obviously,
fraud has been illegal since this legal tradition began. Proving com-
mon law fraud requires showing misrepresentation of a material fact,
intent, reliance, causation, and actual damages—simply put, some-
body has to hurt somebody else deliberately by tricking them.83 But
securities law does much more. Rather than just prohibiting injury,
securities law establishes affirmative duties and punishes failure to
fulfill such duties. All publicly traded companies must disclose mate-
rial information,84 regardless of intent to deceive and before anyone
has gotten hurt. More interestingly still, reporting companies must
disclose information not just for persons who buy securities from them
but for the benefit of the secondary market, that is, third parties trad-
ing the company’s shares amongst themselves or merely contemplat-
ing such trades.85
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017). See Thel, supra note 75, at 408.
83. The relationship between securities fraud and common law fraud is a close one,
though securities fraud is generally considered easier to establish than common
law fraud. But see Carrie Guo, Credit Rating Agency Reform: A Review of
Dodd–Frank Section 933(B)’s Effect (or Lack Thereof) Since Enactment, 2016
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 184, 211 (arguing that U.S. Supreme Court decisions in re-
cent years have greatly narrowed the scope of private actions under Exchange
Act section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and as a result, private plaintiffs have fallen
back on state common law claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation).
84. The securities laws include a variety of disclosure obligations, including periodic
reporting and prompt disclosures when significant events take place. See, e.g.,
Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2005). What precisely must be disclosed is usu-
ally, though not always, determined by whether it would be material to investors.
As a result, whether something is material is often at issue. See Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (holding that information that is important to in-
vestors is material, and establishing the probability-vs.-magnitude test for deter-
mining when speculative information is material).
85. Not to mention the army of advisors, analysts, reporters, activists, bloggers, and
countless others who follow that stock or the markets generally. Disclosure also
provides opportunities for companies to present themselves in a favorable light,
potentially pitting their natural self-interest against the regulatory agenda. For a
discussion of this issue in the context of the Enron accounting scandal, see David
A. Westbrook, Corporation Law After Enron: The Possibility of a Capitalist
Reimagination, 92 GEO. L.J. 61 (2003) (explaining Enron’s collapse as a result of
financial engineering and misleading accounting practices “disclosed” to inflate
stock prices and, in turn, executive compensation).
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Disclosure traditionally serves another familiar purpose: the crea-
tion of liquid and informationally efficient capital markets (the foun-
dation of the fraud-on-the-market theory).86 Particularly in the
United States, the capital markets have been understood as the con-
text in which competition happens.87 The capital markets form the
backbone of the portfolios that underlie education, retirement savings,
and much else in civil society. The capital markets are thus a mecha-
nism for social decision, and it is therefore important to ensure that
such decisions are made on good information.88 Moreover, liquidity is
ensured by widespread participation in the capital markets, which in
turn is fostered by public confidence in the market. Such confidence is
promoted by ensuring that information about companies is public and
that the game is perceived to be fair to all participants. Consequently,
the securities laws mandate extensive public disclosure of company
information. They also make insider trading illegal: it is illegal for
most people to trade securities based on material nonpublic informa-
tion.89 In brief, it is difficult to understand a mandatory-disclosure re-
gime without some reference to an ideal of the capital markets as both
deeply informed and essentially public.90
86. The fraud-on-the-market theory was articulated in Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241.
87. This is accomplished largely by making takeovers possible. Henry G. Manne,
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
88. Of course, this point may be overextended. For example, Jack Bogle, the inventor
of the modern index fund and the founder, in 1976, of The Vanguard Group, Inc.
has said:
The stock market has nothing—n-o-t-h-i-n-g—to do with the allocation
of capital. All it means is that if you’re buying General Motors stock, say,
someone else is selling it to you. Capital isn’t allocated—the ownership
just changes. I may be an investor, you may be a speculator. But no capi-
tal goes anywhere. This is basically a closed system. You have new IPOs
and whatnot, but they’re very small compared to this vast thing we call a
market, which is now around $24 trillion. The allocation of capital?
That’s just nonsense.
Michael Regan, Q&A with Jack Bogle: “We’re in the Middle of a Revolution”,
BLOOMBERG MARKETS (Nov. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-
jack-bogle-interview [https://perma.unl.edu/9DQQ-7JRT]. There is much more to
be said, of course, about ways in which even secondary markets have an influence
on operating firms: the cost of capital, executive compensation, the market for
corporate control, et cetera, but Bogle’s point is nevertheless an important one.
89. Insider trading was illegal under common law, Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419
(1909), but more recently is illegal based on Rule 10b-5. Rule 10b-5, supra note
82. The doctrine has developed over time and is still somewhat in flux. See
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016) (upholding the personal-benefit
standard articulated by the Dirks case); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997) (accepting the misappropriation theory of insider trading); Dirks v. SEC,
463 U.S. 646 (1983) (setting out the test for tipper–tippee liability); Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (articulating the narrow, “classical” concep-
tion of insider trading).
90. It is important to bear in mind that this is a regulative ideal; the capital markets
do not ever actually achieve this ideal. In the context of insider trading, the Su-
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Fraud prevention and informational efficiency, however, are only
partial understandings of mandatory disclosure. Each of these comple-
mentary regulative ideals entails a different object of regulation. To
understand disclosure in terms of deterring fraud and ensuring a level
playing field is to understand securities law as regulation of individ-
ual trades on behalf of individual investors. Such an approach is a
form of consumer protection. To understand disclosure in terms of in-
formational efficiency is to understand securities law as the regulation
of not just a market but what might broadly speaking be called capi-
talist social ordering.
Mandatory disclosure also has a profound effect on the companies
that must do the disclosing. Thus, in addition to consumer regulation
or regulation of the capital markets, disclosure may be understood as
the regulation of companies, as corporate governance.91 Disclosure
rules are important not only for what they require companies to do
(expose themselves to public scrutiny) but also for how they force com-
panies to act. Disclosure rules have the effect of making corporations
operate bureaucratically as a condition to offering securities to the
public. Publicly filing the reams of information required by law prior
to a securities offering, and updating and amending such information
quarterly, annually, and as occasion warrants, is a great deal of work,
particularly since passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
(Sarbanes–Oxley Act)92 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010
preme Court has refused to uphold the Securities and Exchange Commission’s
theory that the securities markets are, as a matter of law, level playing fields;
that is, the Supreme Court has refused to require that all participants in the
market be equally well-informed. At some very basic level, even in public mar-
kets, even in the age of Internet communication, a great deal of trading is moti-
vated by the belief that the trader knows something other people do not. People
must believe they have an informational advantage or they will not trade. Upon
reflection, moreover, it turns out that communicating “the truth” about a busi-
ness is just as hard as communicating the truth about anything else. Much eco-
nomic thought has been normatively organized by the concept of informationally
efficient markets, but it is very difficult if not impossible to know how close we
have come to creating such markets. See generally David A. Westbrook, Telling
All: The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Ideal of Transparency, 2004 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 441.
91. Although corporate governance has traditionally been a matter of state corpora-
tions law, the increasing regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission
in the form of, among other things, disclosure requirements has been part of the
steady federalization of corporate governance. See Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing
the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange Commission
Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005) (arguing
that with the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, including its increased disclo-
sure requirements, the SEC has assumed authority for the regulation of corpo-
rate governance of issuers).
92. For a thorough analysis of the burdens imposed by, and the backlash against, the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, see Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393 (2006) (arguing
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(Dodd–Frank Act).93 To fulfill these legal requirements, corporations
have to hire outside bureaucrats (including lawyers, accountants, and
bankers) in order to deal with the army of public bureaucrats (regula-
tors) and private bureaucrats (investment advisers, institutional in-
vestors, and the like) who scrutinize such financings. Substantively,
the company’s major decisions must be defensible to a distant public
and to the institution’s existing clientele. Disclosure laws thus require
not merely the publication of information but, much more subtly, that
“private” enterprises become aptly named “public companies,” that is,
bureaucracies.
As businesses become more bureaucratic, corporate rulers (epito-
mized by Henry Ford94) are replaced with corporate officials, men in
gray flannel suits who run our largest companies. The process is anal-
ogous to the rise of the modern nation-state, in which royal or aristo-
cratic rulers were gradually replaced with government functionaries.
In this view, the deeper significance of compliance with disclosure
laws is not the prevention of fraud, the enhancement of informational
efficiency, or even the costs of compliance that some business leaders
and law-and-economics scholars complain about. Instead, the signifi-
cance of compliance with disclosure laws is the process of making busi-
ness modern in a Weberian sense. Modern business is depersonalized,
official, and bureaucratic. It is public rather than private, rational
rather than personal, in character.
Compliance with a disclosure regime transforms the exercise of ec-
onomic power. In a company that discloses, power is not exercised by
robber barons, “captains of industry,” or other capricious individuals
but by boring bureaucrats—the ideal managers of modern corpora-
tions. There is something comforting, in a rule-of-law sort of way,
about adoption of bureaucratic practices. Bureaucrats may wield vast
power, but they do so only officially. They, being bureaucrats, must
provide a great deal of rationalist planning and justification. The exer-
cise of bureaucratic power is checked through the oversight of other
institutions, most obviously in the disclosure context, by the analysts
and other gatekeepers of the stock market and ultimately the invest-
ment community itself.95
that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act signaled the restarting of a cycle of periodic growth
and decay of securities law).
93. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R.
4173, 111th Cong. (2010).
94. A classic corporation law case is Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., which featured a semi-
successful challenge to the almost complete control Henry Ford exercised over his
company by two shareholders of the company, the Dodge brothers. 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919).
95. For an in-depth analysis of gatekeepers in the capital markets, see Frank
Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liabil-
ity Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 522 (2001) (considering whether a regulatory
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In a society with liberal commitments, disclosure is a more accept-
able means of limiting economic power than redistribution because
disclosure obligations are triggered by the company’s choice to offer
securities to the public. Redistribution, direct regulation, and even ju-
dicial enforcement of rights held by shareholders and others all in-
volve the intervention of the state. Disclosure requirements, and
hence the adoption of bureaucratic practices, result from something
done by the company itself, to itself.
Securities law worked, at least as lately as the end of the twentieth
century, because the public markets were where the big money was.
In the public markets, certain company objectives required levels of
capital that could only be found in the broad and deep public markets.
In order to sell into those markets, the law required obedience to the
rules of the markets. So, for example, when Daimler-Benz entered the
U.S. market in 1993, listing its shares on the New York Stock Ex-
change, it agreed to publish its financial information in accordance
with U.S. GAAP.96 Even lesser transactions, like realizing the wealth
of a real estate investment trust or a successful new business, have
long enticed companies into the public capital markets. As a condition
of entry into such markets, securities law demands quarterly report-
ing of vast quantities of information that might be material97 to an
investment decision, updated upon the occurrence of significant
events,98 which in turn requires the meticulous keeping of books and
records,99 the segregation of funds, and especially the establishment
of putatively rational processes for decision-making.100 In complying,
regime for gatekeepers might improve the regulatory regime governing issuers of
securities in the public markets).
96. Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Regarding
the Listing of Shaires of Daimler-Benz in the U.S. Securities Market (Mar. 30,
1993), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1993/033093breeden.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/B9FP-3GR8]. The changeover resulted in the company reporting its
first-ever loss. David Duffy & Lachlan Murray, The Wooing of American Inves-
tors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 1994, at A14; John Schmidt, Daimler-Benz Reports
First-Ever Loss, Reflecting New Accounting, Lower Sales, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20,
1993, at A10. GAAP stands for Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, the
standard accounting practice in the United States, as published by the Financial
Accounting Standards Board. For a fuller discussion of foreign issuers and the
mid-1990s requirements for entering the U.S. markets, see Jay D. Hansen,
London Calling?: A Comparison of the London and U.S. Stock Exchange Listing
Requirements for Foreign Equity Securities, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 197
(1995); Michael A. Schneider, Foreign Listings and the Preeminence of U.S. Se-
curities Exchanges: Should the SEC Recognize Foreign Accounting Standards?, 3
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 301 (1994).
97. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2017).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-11 (2017).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(2)(A) (2017).
100. For a critical analysis of the competing pressures of disclosure requirements
under the U.S. securities laws, see Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The
SEC Is Riding Off in Two Directions at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781 (2016).
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firms and their captains were forced to become public—in other
words: official, bureaucratic, and accountable.
Traditionally, the bigger a company is (and the more politically
problematic its power), the more likely it is to have offered securities
to the public, thereby triggering the disclosure requirements that ra-
tionalize its power. If a company is to grow beyond a certain size, espe-
cially through acquisition, then it is likely to need financing that,
again at least until recently, has been exclusively available through
the public markets. So companies can either remain smaller and more
personal or grow and be rationalized. Through the Silicon Valley Bub-
ble of the late 1990s, this seemed like a fair description of the tacit
quid pro quo at the heart of this commercial republic.
One might wonder why a baron—the founder of a company—would
become a bureaucrat, absent the revolution. One reason may be be-
cause firms are capitalized at a multiple of earnings. As a result, the
founders, managers, and early investors of successful companies have
the opportunity to acquire vast private wealth which can be realized
after a public offering provides the necessary liquidity for their owner-
ship interests. For these and other reasons, a company’s management
is often overwhelmingly tempted to do a public offering, even though
raising capital in the public markets subjects management to the legal
obligations of financial disclosure and, less obviously, to the process of
bureaucratic depersonalization.
Of course, legal obligation is not the same thing as compliance or
obedience. Some managers who founded and built their companies
from scratch, like Adelphia’s John Rigas101 or Parmalat’s Calisto
Tanzi,102 and some business wizards, like Enron’s Andrew Fastow103
or Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski,104 may offer securities to the public and
101. Adelphia Communications Corp. was founded in 1952 by John Rigas and mem-
bers of his family and became a public company in 1986 when it listed on the
NASDAQ. In 2002, Rigas and his son were convicted of corporate fraud. See
United States v. Rigas, 258 F. Supp. 2d 299 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); SEC v. Adelphia
Commc’ns Corp., 02 Civ. 5776 (KW) (S.D.N.Y. filed July 24, 2002); Adelphia v.
Rigas, 323 B.R. 345 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005).
102. Calisto Tanzi founded Parmalat S.p.A. in 1961. Following Parmalat’s collapse in
2003, Tanzi was convicted of fraud and embezzlement. Liam Moloney & Salva-
tore Pizzo, Parmalat Founder Receives 18-Year Prison Sentence, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
10, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870376670457600945
4272081990.
103. Andrew Fastow was Enron’s Chief Financial Officer, described as a “money wiz-
ard” whose complex financial vehicles contributed to the company’s collapse. Bill
Saporito, How Fastow Helped Enron Fall, TIME (Feb. 10, 2002), http://content
.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,201871,00.html.
104. Dennis Kozlowski was Chief Executive Officer of Tyco International and was
credited with leading the company through a period of explosive growth and prof-
itability in the 1990s. He was convicted of multiple felonies related to the com-
pany mismanagement. Catherine S. Neal, Former Tyco CEO Dennis Kozlowski
Was One of the Great All-Time Value Creators, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www
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yet resist, consciously or not, becoming or being replaced by bureau-
crats in gray flannel suits. Sometimes such founders or geniuses oper-
ate outside the requirements of the disclosure regime and run afoul of
the securities laws. After all, the disclosure regime, by its very opera-
tion, depersonalizes them. Entrepreneurs, to say nothing of empire
builders, tend to have something else in mind. The law, however, has
attempted to prevent such individuals, with control over so much
wealth and therefore power, from operating unscrutinized and subject
only to their own all-too-human desires. Better that such individuals
be made into, or give way to, corporate officers.105
Mandatory-disclosure regimes, as a condition for access to the capi-
tal markets, are thus mechanisms for the bureaucratization—and in
that sense, modernization—of companies. In so doing, the establish-
ment of disclosure regimes indirectly addressed perhaps the core
worry of corporate governance and much social thought in capitalist
societies that aspire to democracy: the concentration of power in the
hands of the few. Disclosure regimes transform the character and situ-
ation of those who wield economic power not by imposing limits or
redistributing power but by making business leaders into managers
who operate in public, rather than rulers who operate according to
their personal desires. It is, of course, much better to be the king than
the accountant, and a degree of resistance to this process of
bureaucratization is to be expected.
D. Participation
Historically, popular participation in, and the success of, the U.S.
equity markets is undeniable. Organized stock markets began in Am-
sterdam in 1602 and London in 1698 but did not start until almost a
century later in the United States, in 1792.106 By 1899, the U.S. stock
market was the second largest in the world (15%), after the United
Kingdom (25%) and just ahead of Germany (13%) and France
.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/12/09/former-tyco-ceo-dennis-kozlowski-was-one-
of-the-great-all-time-value-creators/#42b2204d583f [https://perma.unl.edu/
C3BQ-U86Q].
105. For a discussion of the popular view of business as empty of narrative possibility,
see Mae Kuykendall, No Imagination: The Marginal Role of Narrative in Corpo-
rate Law, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 539 (2007) (examining the significance of the
disjunction between the narrative and both the activities of business and the con-
tent of corporate law).
106. ELROY DIMSON, PAUL MARSH & MIKE STAUNTON, CREDIT SUISSE, CREDIT SUISSE
GLOBAL INVESTMENT RETURNS YEARBOOK 2017: SUMMARY EDITION 7 (2017) https:/
/publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=B8FDD84D-A4CD-D98
3-12840F52F61BA0B4 [https://perma.unl.edu/KU2L-JCAR].
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(11.5%).107 By December 2016, the U.S. stock market was estimated
to have 53.2% of the world’s listed total.108
The U.S. enthusiasm for equities predates federal securities law.
Businesses relied heavily on the equity markets for capital in the
early 1900s, and in the 1920s the whole country seemed interested in
the stock market.109 By the Crash of 1929, the United States had be-
come an “equity culture.”110
Albeit, after the Crash of 1929, stock market participation fell for
some decades. But America’s “newly prosperous middle class” re-
turned to investing in the equity markets in the 1960s and early
1970s.111 Nationally, as a percentage of U.S. households, stock owner-
ship reached a high of 51.9% in 2001.112  At that peak, direct owner-
ship of stocks was 21.3%.113 In the same year, the dotcom bubble
crashed, and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, occurred. To-
tal participation in the stock market, either directly as a retail inves-
tor or indirectly through a mutual fund or other beneficial
arrangement, declined somewhat thereafter prior to its rising again,
this time to a new and slightly higher peak, shortly before the Global
Financial Crisis. At this peak 2007 precipice, 53.2% of households
owned stock directly or indirectly.114
This number has ebbed. The most recent Federal Reserve Survey
of Consumer Finance, which comes out every three years, found that
only 48.8% of Americans held stock in 2013, the lowest level since
1995.115 Here, stocks were found to be held directly by only 13.8% of
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ethiopis Tafara, Dir. of Int’l Affairs, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks Before
the Federation of European Accountants: International Financial Reporting
Standards and the U.S. Capital Market (Dec. 1, 2005), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch120105et.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/D3F8-V3DG] (stating that by
the 1920s, everyone seemed interested in the stock market).
110. Id.
111. Christopher Farrell, The Making of an Equity Culture: As Badly as Investors
Have Been Treated in Recent Times, They Haven’t Fled the Market. That Phenom-
enon Is a Reason for Hope, BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2003), https://www.bloomberg
.com/news/articles/2003-07-10/the-making-of-an-equity-culture.
112. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising
Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze—An Update to 2007 (Levy Econ. Inst., Work-
ing Paper No. 159, 2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=15
85409.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Changes in U.S. Family Fi-
nances from 2010 to 2013: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED.
RES. BULL., Sept. 2014, https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/
scf14.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/PZ5Z-38K3]. The last year for which complete
data was available for the 2010–2013 Survey, which was published in September
of 2014, was 2012.
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households.116 Although commentator estimates of total participation
in the stock market vary, all do seem to point in the same direction.
While the new Federal Reserve Bank data are not available as of this
writing, a 2016 Gallup poll found that 52% of American adults say
they own stocks in some fashion, tying the low (over the nineteen-year
life of the survey) set in 2013.117 And a 2016 Bankrate survey found
that just 43% of American adults owned stock in any fashion (54%
said they did not, and 3% either did not know or refused to answer the
poll).118
Almost tautologically, stock market participation is skewed to-
wards the wealthy, who are both more likely to own stocks and, if they
do own stocks, more likely to own more stocks (hence, “wealthy”). In
2013, for example, 92.3% of the top ten percent of households by in-
come participated in the stock market. The mean value of the holding
of such households was $9,693,000.119 This trend seems to be intensi-
fying: in 2014, households above the ninetieth percentile in income
were the only ones increasing their stock ownership.120
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) officials have described the creation of the U.S. equity culture,
with its broad participation, as due in large degree to the laws and
regulations that informed the public market and the actions of the
SEC in particular. In a 2007 talk, Eric Sirri, Director of the SEC Divi-
sion of Market Regulation, explained:
The SEC has had a fundamental role in the growth of the financial services
markets—while working to maintain the integrity and vitality of the markets
and protecting the interests of investors. Examples of regulatory changes that
have facilitated innovation in the financial services markets include: the order
handling rules, which cleared the way for electronic markets, best execution
obligations, pennies in equities, penny pilot in options, Regulation NMS, and
TRACE.121
Widespread U.S.-investor participation in the public equity mar-
kets has also been attributed to corporate-governance mechanisms.
116. Id. at 16.
117. See Justin McCarthy, Just over Half of Americans Own Stocks, Matching Record
Low, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.gallup.com/poll/190883/half-americans-
own-stocks-matching-record-low.aspx. The Gallup poll seems to track higher
than either the Federal Reserve or the Bankrate polls, but the same trends are
evident.
118. See Jill Cornfield, Millenials Slow to Start Investing in Stock Market, Bankrate
Survey Finds, BANKRATE (July 6, 2016), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/con-
sumer-index/money-pulse-0716.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/4WCV-KJT8].
119. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 115.
120. Josh Zumbrun, Who Owns Stocks? It’s Not Just the Rich, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27,
2014), https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/10/27/who-owns-stocks-its-not-just-
the-rich.
121. Erik R. Sirri, Dir., Div. of Mkt. Regulation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by
SEC Staff: Trading Foreign Shares (Mar. 1, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/2007/spch030107ers.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/8LSX-4CCD].
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The original concern voiced by Berle and Means—that managers
would simply take advantage of shareholders—was hardly the whole
story. As Henry Manne pointed out in the 1960s, if shareholders were
truly abused, they would be willing to sell to a hostile bidder. Manne
argued that the “market for corporate control” served to discipline
managers.122 More simply still, Why would shareholders invest, and
continue to invest, with managers who took advantage of them?123
Turning from corporate governance to investment concerns, share-
holders had other reasons to participate in the stock market. Caps on
interest rates paid by banks and other financial institutions made eq-
uity investment more attractive. Financial innovations, such as
money market and mutual funds, also made financial-market invest-
ment more feasible to middle-class investors. Finally, and probably
most importantly, changes in the tax code made investment for retire-
ment much more attractive.124
While it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the relative im-
portance of the various drivers of stock market participation, it seems
clear that without a reasonable legal regime, the U.S. stock market
would not have been able to grow in the way that it did. Nor would so
many Americans have entrusted, and in turn invested, substantial
portions of their wealth had it not been for their real, if risk-adjusted,
expectations of positive returns. Summarily, whether one speaks of
republican capitalism, the aggregation of middle-class wealth, or an
equity culture, the success of U.S. equity markets presumed and re-
quired a legal structure, and to at least that extent, it can be said that
securities law worked well for much of the twentieth century and into
the twenty-first.
III. PRIVATE EQUITY MARKETS
A. Introduction
On September 22, 2016, the Wall Street Journal published the fol-
lowing two stories: Wall Street’s IPO Business: The Worst in 20
Years125 and Google Arm Joins Airbnb Funding.126 The first article
122. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965) (arguing that potential changes of control serve to discipline corporate
managers); see also Michael P. Dooley, Controlling Giant Corporations: The Ques-
tion of Legitimacy, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PAST & FUTURE 28, 38
(Henry G. Manne ed., 1982) (noting that the limited governance role assigned to
shareholders is an important benefit of the corporate form).
123. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Be-
havior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
124. See Gerald F. Davis, A New Finance Capitalism? Mutual Funds and Ownership
Re-Concentration in the United States, 5 EUR. MGMT. REV. 11 (2008).
125. Maureen Farrell, IPO Drought Scorches Wall Street, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 23, 2016)
[hereinafter Farrell, IPO Drought], http://www.wsj.com/articles/ipo-drought-
scorches-wall-street-1474634214. An identical version appeared the day before as
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noted that “U.S. equity capital markets revenue for banks is lower
than it has been in more than 20 years” and that “the pillar of invest-
ment banking may never fully recover.”127 Why? “The prime reason:
cheap capital . . . companies such as Uber Technologies Inc. and
Airbnb Inc. are staying away from public markets. Private funding
sources are providing robust capital instead.”128 The second article
gave some idea of the scale of the financing involved in these nonpub-
lic financings. “Airbnb Inc. has brought on Alphabet Inc.’s investment
arm as a backer, part of an expected $850 million funding round that
values the home-rental company at $30 billion . . . .”129
If, as argued above, society has long relied on the public-disclosure
regime to bureaucratize and domesticate the corporation, such reli-
ance may be becoming less warranted as larger and larger companies
eschew the public markets. Since roughly the turn of the century, a
number of forces have combined to make going public less attractive
and, at the same time, to make other sources of capital more plausible.
These forces have included the rising cost of going public, the risks
and costs of being publicly traded, the availability of deep nonpublic
pools of capital, the relatively modest capital requirements of many
contemporary companies, especially “tech” firms, and a low interest
rate environment.
B. The Rise of the Private Equity Market and the Relative
Decline of the Initial Public Offering Market
The journal Fortune now keeps a list of unicorns: private compa-
nies valued at over a billion dollars.130 The companies are valued by
the cost per share paid by the latest stage of venture capital. As of
early 2017, over 170 such privately funded companies reportedly had
a combined valuation of over $600 billion.131 Apparently, and for rea-
sons discussed below, it is no longer necessary, or in many circum-
Wall Street’s IPO Business: The Worst in 20 Years. See Maureen Farrell, Wall
Street’s IPO Business: The Worst in 20 Years, WALL ST. J (Sept. 22, 2016), https://
www.wsj.com/articles/wall-streets-stock-selling-business-the-worst-in-20-years-
1474536602.
126. Maureen Farrell & Greg Bensinger, Airbnb’s Funding Round Led by Google Cap-
ital, WALL ST. J., (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/airbnb-raises-850-
million-at-30-billion-valuation-1474569670.
127. Farrell, IPO Drought, supra note 125.
128. Id.
129. Farrell & Bensinger, supra note 126.
130. Unicorn List, FORTUNE, http://fortune.com/unicorns [https://perma.unl.edu/VZ8N-
7Y3B].
131. Id. (showing 174 companies on the list). But see Tom Zanki, SEC Chair Faces
Uphill Climb in Reviving IPO Market, LAW360 (May 17, 2017), https://www
.law360.com/articles/925181/sec-chair-faces-uphill-climb-in-reviving-ipo-market
(reporting that the venture capital database maintained by CB Insights puts the
number at 196).
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stances desirable, to finance business expansion through a public
offering. For example, Uber raised over $8 billion from private equity
firms and sovereign funds and $3 billion of private debt during the
seven-year period between 2010 and 2017, compared with Facebook’s
ability to raise $2.4 billion of private equity over seven years just a few
years earlier.132
The same upward trend can be seen in the venture capital mar-
kets. In 2015, there were 7125 venture capital investment deals
worldwide, which raised a total of $135.6 billion. Of that, $72.3 billion
was raised in the United States, compared to $58.2 billion in 2014 and
$36 billion in 2013.133 There is a strong upward trend in venture capi-
tal-backed company formations as well. In 2016, 187 early-stage com-
panies received seed money, 1299 companies benefitted from a first
funding round, and 817 companies received their second funding
round.134 The number of private companies that have had multiple
venture capital-backed funding rounds is also increasing. In 2016,
there were fifty-six deals involving private companies with five or
more venture capital-based financing rounds, raising approximately
$9.3 billion dollars.135 Comparatively speaking, in 2005, there were
only twenty-nine companies that had had five or more financing
rounds, with $700 million raised.136
As the private market has grown, the public offering market has
shrunk. In turn, there has been a marked drop-off in initial public
offerings (IPOs). For example, there was a discernable decrease in
2016 IPO numbers from those of 2015. Where 2015 saw 174 IPOs,
raised over $34 billion, and represented the lowest dollar and issuance
volumes since 2003 and 2009 respectively, 2016 saw merely 105 IPOs,
while raising only approximately $20 billion.137 Moreover, the second-
132. GLEN GIOVANNETTI, WHY ARE MORE COMPANIES STAYING PRIVATE? 12 (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/giovannetti-presentation-acsec-021517
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/H97F-ACYN]. For details of Uber’s funding, see Uber:
Funding Rounds, CRUNCHBASE, https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/uber/
funding-rounds [https://perma.unl.edu/6FRG-EY2N].
133. JAMIE HUTCHINSON, WHY ARE MORE COMPANIES STAYING PRIVATE? (2017), https://
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/hutchinson-goodwin-presentation-acsec-021517
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8J2P-ZHDG].
134. GIOVANNETTI, supra note 132, at 5.
135. Michael Greene, Encouraging Companies to Go Public Won’t Be Easy, BLOOM-
BERG BNA (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.bna.com/encouraging-companies-go-n579
82083827 [https://perma.unl.edu/ZN4D-SZYT].
136. Id.
137. Michelle Gasaway & Benjamin K. Marsh, Volatility and Uncertainty Continue in
the U.S. Capital Markets, SKADDEN INSIGHTS (Jan. 30, 2017) https://www.skad-
den.com/insights/volatility-and-uncertainty-continue-us-capital-markets (attrib-
uting the low number to volatility and the fact that several IPO candidates chose
to consummate a private equity sale process instead). For a database of all IPOs
in 2016, see 2016 IPO Index, ACCOMPANY, https://www.accompany.com/insights/
2016-ipos [https://perma.unl.edu/93BM-CPAS] (listing 106 IPOs from 2017). But
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longest IPO drought in the New York Stock Exchange’s history also
occurred in 2016.138 Overall, 2016 was a far cry from 1996, only
twenty years earlier, at the height of the technology bubble, which
saw 863 companies go public.139
Modernly, the trend continues. The private market is now substan-
tially larger than the public markets140 and growing. In fact, a 2014
study conducted by the SEC found that “the total capital raised annu-
ally in the private capital market is large both in absolute terms and
when compared to the amounts raised in the public markets. In 2014,
registered offerings accounted for $1.35 trillion of new capital com-
pared to $2.1 trillion reported raised through all private offering
channels.”141
In effect, the number of public companies has decreased by over
half since its 1996 peak.142 In the ordinary course of business, merg-
ers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies have reduced the overall number
of registered companies. In addition, there have been numerous delist-
ings in recent years, notably after the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley
Act.143 Owing to the fact these rank reductions in public companies
have not been replenished by IPO activity, a net decline in the number
of public companies has resulted.144
Diminishing public companies have been exacerbated by the grow-
ing trend for companies to delay their public offering. For example,
see Andrew Ramonas, Ex-SEC Commissioner Atkins Blames IPO Dearth on Regu-
lations, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 12, 2017) https://www.bna.com/exsec-commis-
sioner-atkins-n73014453178 [https://perma.unl.edu/CC9W-DS36] (reporting
that, according to Bloomberg data, 130 companies went public in 2016). This
downturn is particularly notable in the technology sector where a fourth-quarter
2016 report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers found that the global technology IPO
market declined to its lowest level in a decade in 2016, with only 16 public offer-
ings (and proceeds of $1.8 billion). PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GLOBAL TECHNOL-
OGY IPO REVIEW FULL-YEAR AND Q4 2016, at 15 (2017), http://www.pwc.com/gx/
en/technology/ipo-review/global-technology-ipo-review-full-year-and-q4-2016
.pdf#page=4 [https://perma.unl.edu/WJ9L-VWMB] (predicting recovery in 2017
led by dual-track offerings).
138. Fred Imbert, IPO Market Stuck in Second-Longest Drought Ever: Report, CNBC
(Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/17/ipo-market-stuck-in-second-
longest-drought-ever-report.html [https://perma.unl.edu/TRW6-YGX6] (pointing
out that the longest drought was during the financial crisis, with only two offer-
ings between August 7, 2008, and February 10, 2009).
139. Ramonas, supra note 137.
140. See SCOTT BAUGESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, CAPITAL RAISING
IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED SECURITIES OFFER-
INGS, 2009–2014, at 7 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/
unregistered-offering10-2015.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/V37B-C8F7].
141. Id. at 6.
142. Greene, supra note 135 (noting that there are currently about six million large
and small private companies, while there are only about 4500 public companies).
143. See infra subsection III.C.1.
144. GIOVANNETTI, supra note 132, at 1.
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the average age of U.S. technology companies that went public in 1999
was four years. In 2014, it was eleven years.145 Seemingly, the robust
private-placement market may satisfy company insiders’ cash-out
agendas and enable companies to grow relatively large before they
need to subject themselves to the cost and oversight of the public
markets.146
This marked public-to-private shift has been a novel one. For
years, going public was often the best, and sometimes the only practi-
cal, way for a company to access the amounts of capital it needed, both
to realize the business and to reward its founders, employees, and
early investors. Firms that sought large-scale financing were able to
gain access to a substantial portion of the nation’s dispersed wealth by
selling securities to the public. Viewed macroeconomically, public eq-
uity markets aggregated capital, mostly from households from across
the nation, so that it could be invested by large enterprises. The stock
market intermediated between large users of capital and small provid-
ers of capital, middle-class households. The regulatory burdens and
attendant costs, on both initial offerings and on life as a publicly
traded entity, were literally the cost of expanding business.
Arguably, public equity markets fit well and make sense in a mid-
dle-class nation. Throughout much of the twentieth century, many
households had some money in excess of their day-to-day require-
ments and available for investment. Just two months before the Crash
of 1929, John Jakob Raskob, the builder of the Empire State Building,
urged readers of the Ladies Home Journal to invest in the stock mar-
ket.147 His article, Everybody Ought to Be Rich, argued: “If a man
saves $15 a week, and invests in good common stocks, and allows the
dividends and rights to accumulate, at the end of twenty years he will
have at least $80,000 and an income from investments of around $400
a month. He will be rich.”148
While the sums invested by individual households were insuffi-
cient to finance great enterprises, the capital of thousands of house-
holds proved more than adequate to finance decades of economic
expansion, indeed the creation of the world’s largest economy. The
public equity markets thus presume that the middle class has a soci-
ety’s surplus wealth and that aggregating that wealth makes the cost
145. HUTCHINSON, supra note 133, at 5.
146. DAVID J. GOLDSCHMIDT & YASMEENA F. CHAUDRY, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGER
& FLOM LLP, U.S. IPO MARKET REVIEW AND OUTLOOK: CAN THE PACE CONTINUE?
(2015), https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/US_IPO_Market
_Review_and_Outlook_-_Can_the_Pace_Continue.pdf (discussing financial spon-
sor-backed IPOs).
147. This account of Raskob’s article was part of the remarks delivered by Ethiopis
Tafara, Director of the SEC Office of International Affairs, before the Federation
of European Accountants in 2005. Tafara, supra note 109.
148. Id.
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and bother of running a public company worthwhile. As discussed be-
low, however, in a society that is not middle class, where wealth is
concentrated in the hands of a few, there may be less reason for com-
panies to go public and, by extension, for a public equity market at all.
C. Reasons for the Rise of the Private Equity Market and
the Decline of the Initial Public Offering Market
Academics, regulators, businesspersons, and investors have ad-
vanced a variety of reasons for this shift in the way capital is raised in
the United States.
1. Cost
An IPO is a complex, expensive undertaking, traditionally generat-
ing great fees for bankers and lawyers. These costs have risen in re-
cent years. In 2015, PwC estimated that, excluding the underwriting
discount, the average company undertaking an IPO incurred $3.9 mil-
lion of costs directly attributable to the offering and $1 million in one-
time costs to convert its organization to a public company.149 More
importantly, however, offering securities to the public imposes ongo-
ing costs on the company. Over sixty percent of the public companies
surveyed by PwC reported that they spent over $1 million annually on
recurring costs as a result of being public.150
Some of these costs have increased sharply in the twenty-first cen-
tury.151 In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals,
Congress passed the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in 2002,152 which imposed
additional reporting obligations on publicly traded companies and also
149. PWC DEALS, CONSIDERING AN IPO? AN INSIGHT INTO THE COSTS POST-JOBS ACT 5
(2015), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/assets/ipo-costs-considerations-pwc-deals
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/EX6H-THZE].
150. Id.
151. See Thomas W. Farley, President, N.Y. Stock Exch., Testimony Before the U.S.
House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Capital Markets, Se-
curities, and Investment Subcommittee (July 18, 2017), https://financialser-
vices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/hhrg-115-ba16-wstate-tfarley-20170718.pdf [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/EHM5-QWB3] (suggesting that compliance with securities regu-
lations imposed in the last fifteen years has created barriers to private companies
considering IPOs). There have also been a number of recent efforts to counteract
the barriers to entry into the public markets. For example, as of July 10, 2017,
the SEC enacted a new policy allowing all companies to file confidential draft
registration documents for IPOs. Announcement, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Draft Registration Statement Processing Procedures Expanded (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/announcement/draft-registration-statement-process-
ing-procedures-expanded [https://perma.unl.edu/AL6Z-BLXJ]. On September 5,
2017, the U.S. House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed the Improving
Access to Capital Act to enable reporting companies to use the SEC Regulation A
Plus exemption from registration. See H.R. 2864, 115th Cong. (2017).
152. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.745.
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required certain structures, notably audit and compensation commit-
tees composed of independent directors. In response to the 2008 Fi-
nancial Crisis, Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act in 2010,153
which, among many other things, again imposed various operational
burdens on publicly traded companies. Securities laws have provided
the hook for legislative efforts to improve corporate behavior of pub-
licly traded companies in many broadened ways.154 Potential share-
holder litigation, transparency to the competition, and compliance
impose costs,155 and companies sensibly seek to avoid such costs. At
the same time, and maybe more importantly, complex rules add to the
“management attention” costs of being a public company. Compliance
is generally a bother—a startup company with seventy-five employees
does not want to devote a great deal of money for, and attention to,
reporting requirements.
2. Deep, Nonpublic Pools of Capital
Control of a substantial portion of the nation’s assets has shifted to
a relatively small number of people who are, by definition, wealthy.
For present purposes, wealth matters because companies that limit
sales of their securities to the wealthy (legally defined in various
ways, notably as “accredited investors”156) are eligible for certain ex-
emptions from the mandatory-disclosure regime established by the se-
curities laws. Accredited investors, referred to in 2017 as the “Davos
jet-set” by Acting SEC Chairman Michael Piwowar,157 are persons
with a minimum annual salary of $200,000 individually or $300,000
jointly with his or her spouse and persons with a net worth exceeding
153. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
154. Jay Clayton, newly appointed Chairman of the SEC in June 2017, announced
that the SEC was considering how to increase the “attractiveness” of the public
markets and whether the SEC’s mission needed to be adjusted in light of the
changed markets. Andrew Ramonas, New SEC Chair Seeks Paths to Enhance
IPO “Attractiveness”, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.bna.com/new-
sec-chair-n73014460636 [https://perma.unl.edu/T5FU-XEU3].
155. HUTCHINSON, supra note 133, at 14. Being a public company also reduces man-
agement’s operating flexibility because the press, and shareholders, may have a
short-term focus on profitability that makes long-term goals difficult to achieve.
156. See supra note 11.
157. In February 2016, Acting SEC Chairman Michael Piwowar criticized the accred-
ited investor regime at a securities law conference as creating “arbitrary catego-
ries” and expressed concerns about the usefulness of the “artificial distinction”
created by the regulations. Acting Chairman Piwowar stated, “I question the no-
tion that non-accredited investors are truly protected by regulations that prevent
them from investing in high-risk, high-return securities available only to the
Davos jet-set.” Andrew Ramonas, SEC’s Piwowar Renews Attack on “Accredited”
Investor Regime, Bloomberg BNA (Feb, 27, 2017), https://www.bna.com/secs-
piwowar-renews-n57982084407 [https://perma.unl.edu/EJ9R-BJPU].
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$1,000,000. Accredited investors make up a small minority of the U.S.
population.158
Companies’ ability to raise the needed capital from accredited in-
vestors increased following passage of the Jumpstart Our Business
Startups (JOBS) Act in 2012.159 Before the JOBS Act, when a com-
pany reached the five hundred shareholders of record (e.g., accredited
investor) limit, SEC registration and thus an IPO were required.
(Reaching the limit, for example, motivated both Google and Facebook
to go to the public markets.) However, section 501 of the JOBS Act
raised that limit to two thousand and excluded employees receiving
exempt equity awards. This change has enabled many companies, es-
pecially those in the technology industry, to stay private longer.160 In
turn, companies using the “private placement” mechanism to raise
capital manage to avoid some of the most burdensome securities law
compliance and attendant costs by targeting investment opportunities
exclusively to accredited investors.
These private placements have only served to perpetuate vast and
growing economic divergences among U.S. citizens. In a recent study,
Peter Lindert and Jeffrey Williamson concluded that income inequal-
ity is worse at this time than in any other period in U.S. history. Even
in the slaveholding antebellum South, the difference in material in-
come between society’s richest and poorest does not appear to have
been as great as it is at present.161
Notably, this radical rise in income inequality in the United States
is, historically speaking, relatively recent. For instance, “[b]etween
1947 and 1968, the U.S. Gini index dropped to .386, the lowest ever
recorded. Then it began to climb.”162 The U.S. Census Bureau esti-
mated that the United States had a Gini coefficient of 0.479 in 2015
and 0.480 in 2014.163 Of OECD countries, only Chile and Mexico had
158. See supra notes 12–13.
159. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306
(2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
160. In addition, the JOBS Act removed the ban on general solicitations in private
placements. For a fuller discussion of the impact of the JOBS Act, see A.C. Pritch-
ard, Revisiting “Truth in Securities” Revisited: Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing
Private Markets in the Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999 (2013).
161. See PETER H. LINDERT & JEFFREY G. WILLIAMSON, UNEQUAL GAINS: AMERICAN
GROWTH AND INEQUALITY SINCE 1700 (2016).
162. Jill Lepore, Richer and Poorer: Accounting for Inequality, NEW YORKER (Mar.16,
2015), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/03/16/richer-and-poorer [https:/
/perma.unl.edu/3QRZ-RUT7] (comparing the U.S. Gini index unfavorably with
the Gini indices of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Swe-
den, and Finland). Income inequality is conventionally discussed using the “Gini
Index,” a number between 0 and 1.0, with 0 representing perfect equality of in-
come and 1 representing perfect inequality of income.
163. Historical Income Tables: Income Inequality, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www
.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-income-ine-
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higher measures of income inequality.164 By 2014, the top one percent
of U.S. earners received twenty percent of the national income.165
Income inequality can be traced to three interrelated trends: rising
wage inequality, rising inequality of asset ownership and capital in-
come, and the shift of income (or value) from wages and compensation
to capital.166 Executive compensation, and the closely related compen-
sation of those employed in the financial sector, has a lot to do with
the growing disparity in wages. “CEOs in 1965 made 24 times more
than the average production worker, whereas in 2009 they made 185
times more.”167 By 2015, CEOs leading the S&P 500 index’s top com-
panies earned 340 times what their average workers earned.168 Be-
cause executives are often paid in equity, they also participate in the
shift from wages to capital assets.
Over time, income inequality results in asset inequality. In 2015,
an OECD report claimed that the top ten percent of Americans own
seventy-six percent of the wealth. The top one percent of Americans
controlled thirty-three percent of the wealth in the United States in
2012.169 Especially in light of recent gains in the stock market170 and
the disproportionate share of the markets held by the wealthy, there
quality.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2017) (select Table H-4: “Gini Ratios for House-
holds, by Race and Hispanic Origin of Hosuehold”).
164. Income Inequality, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., https://data.oecd.org/
inequality/income-inequality.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/Z8WD-JTPA]. In 2014,
Chile’s Gini coefficient was .465, Mexico’s was .459, and Iceland’s was the lowest,
at .246. Id.
165. Jeremy Ashkenas, Nine New Findings About Inequality in the United States,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/12/16/busi-
ness/economy/nine-new-findings-about-income-inequality-piketty.html?mcubz=3.
166. LAWRENCE MISHEL & JOSH BIVENS, ECON. POL’Y INST., OCCUPY WALL STREETERS
ARE RIGHT ABOUT SKEWED ECONOMIC REWARDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2011),
http://www.epi.org/files/2011/BriefingPaper331.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/N6SZ-
79Z9].
167. 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality that Everyone Should Know, STAN. CTR. ON POV-
ERTY & INEQ. (2011), http://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-facts-about-
us-inequality-everyone-should-know [https://perma.unl.edu/78G6-NZP9]. The
SEC pay-ratio-disclosure regulations, although instructive on this issue, are be-
yond the scope of this Article.
168. Jana Kasperkevic, America’s Top CEOs Pocket 340 Times More than Average
Workers, GUARDIAN (May 17, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/
may/17/ceo-pay-ratio-average-worker-afl-cio [https://perma.unl.edu/5KUS-
QJZV].
169. Bourree Lam, How Much Wealth and Income Does America’s 1 Percent Really
Have?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2016/03/brookings-1-percent/473478 [https://perma.unl.edu/KH5M-AVP4] (re-
porting that a Brookings Institution paper used the thirty-three-percent statistic,
even though other economists have put the number at forty-two percent).
170. The DJIA closed at 21,005.71 on March 3, 2017. Dow Jones Industrial Average,
GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/finance/historical?q=indexdjx:.dji [https://perma
.unl.edu/T5LT-C6ZQ]. February 2017 featured twelve straight days of record
highs. Caroline Valetkevitch, Dow Jones Closes at Record High for 12th Consecu-
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is reason to believe asset inequality has grown substantially since
then.
As striking as they are, however, such comparative statistics tend
to distract from present purposes. The point here is not that some peo-
ple are categorically richer than others;171 the point is that deep pools
of capital are in relatively few hands. Asked why he robbed banks,
“Slick” Willie Sutton is famously reported to have said, “because that’s
where the money is.”172 Companies now seek private capital for much
the same reason. There is a lot of money in few private hands. Public
offerings are no longer required to aggregate society’s capital.
To be clear: private capital in this context is not solely, or even
primarily, the investment decisions of rich individuals. Many wealthy
people have some, most, or the entirety of their assets under manage-
ment. Many people of relatively modest means have beneficial access
to private markets, notably through mutual funds. Thus, the private
market is inhabited not only by wealthy individuals operating in their
own capacity but by a menagerie of vehicles such as venture capital
funds, private equity, corporate venture capital, hedge funds, sover-
eign wealth funds, mutual fund complexes, and family offices.173 Mul-
tiple types of private investors make it possible to have “[e]arly stage
VCs selling to Growth Equity Investors selling to Mutual Funds and
Sovereign Wealth Funds.”174 The markets have been characterized as
“awash” in private capital,175 with venture capital funds, private eq-
uity, and sovereign funds reportedly struggling to invest the money
they have raised.176
3. Interest Rate Environment
The years since at least the turn of the century have been a time of
historically low real interest rates. In the absence of serious or sus-
tive Session, TIME (Feb. 27, 2017), http://time.com/4684842/dow-jones-record-
high-session [https://perma.unl.edu/ZMT3-KPPZ].
171. There is ample literature addressing this issue. See, e.g., Jill Hamburg Coplan, 12
Signs America Is on the Decline, FORTUNE (Jul. 20, 2015), http://fortune.com/
2015/07/20/united-states-decline-statistics-economic [https://perma.unl.edu/
Y8KW-3JJB] (summarizing findings of a 2015 report by Professors Hershey H.
Friedman and Sarah Hertz showing that the United States ranks poorly in terms
of poverty, income inequality, median wealth per adult, and per capita GDP).
172. Although the quotation is impossible to verify, William Francis Sutton, Jr., did
co-author a book following his release from prison when he was working as a
lecturer and a consultant in the area of bank security. WILLIE SUTTON & EDWARD
LINN, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1976); see Kathryn Edge, Bank Robbers, Bandits,
Hollywood and Fraudsters, 49 TENN. B.J. 22, 22 (2013) (chronicling the careers of
Willie Sutton, Jessie James, and Bonnie and Clyde).
173. HUTCHINSON, supra note 133, at 3.
174. Id. at 8.
175. Id. at 3.
176. GIOVANNETTI, supra note 132, at 12.
2018] CONCENTRATION OF U.S. EQUITY MARKETS 725
tained signs of inflation, central banks have responded to a host of
problems—the bursting of the Internet bubble, the accounting scan-
dals, the September 11 terrorist attacks, sluggish growth generally
but especially in Japan, the Global Financial Crisis, and the European
Debt Crisis—with easy money.
Low-cost money assists management. Large banks and other lend-
ers, desperate for yield, are willing to extend credit and invest. Easy
credit often obviates a company’s need for an onerous public offering.
Projects can be accomplished with borrowed money, and the use of
debt means that management need not offer more equity, thereby
avoiding a shift in the balance of power within the company.177 If the
company has stock outstanding, shareholders can be mollified by re-
purchases, which raise the stock price and provide a tax-deferred and
low-cost (capital gain rather than income) benefit. Such a strategy
may also not incidentally increase the compensation of an executive
paid in options.178 So, for example, Uber took out a $2 billion lever-
aged loan,179 Didi Chuxing received a $2.5 billion syndicated loan, and
Airbnb received $3 billion in debt financing.180 None of this required
access to the public capital markets.
4. Modest Capital Requirements of New Businesses
The companies that dominate today’s new economy, or at least im-
agination of the new economy, may need less financial capital than
their predecessors.181 The classic publicly traded company was a capi-
177. The recent exception to this proposition is the Snap offering, where nonvoting
shares were offered as a part of the IPO. See Michael Greene, Snap IPO Investors
Fired Up Over Dual-Class Stock, BLOOMBERG BNA (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www
.bna.com/snap-ipo-gets-n57982084963 [https://perma.unl.edu/S5BN-7BVP] (not-
ing not only the no-vote shares but also the year-long lockup on approximately
fifty million shares of the Class A common stock). IPOs of no-vote shares, lacking
rights to vote and receive certain information relating to, notably, executive com-
pensation, are still very rare.
178. Reza Espahbodi, Nan Liu & Amy Westbrook, The Effects of the 2006 SEC Execu-
tive Compensation Disclosure Rules on Managerial Incentives, 12 J. CONTEMP.
ACCT. & ECON. 241 (2016) (analyzing the effect of disclosure requirements on the
association between equity-based executive incentives and firm payout choice).
179. Douglas MacMillan & Justin Baer, Uber Raises $1.6 Billion in Debt Offering,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-raises-1-6-billion-
in-goldman-debt-offering-1421877376.
180. Kyle Stanford, Here’s Why the Biggest Unicorns in the World Are Taking on Bil-
lions in Debt, PITCHBOOK (June 17, 2016), http://pitchbook.com/news/articles/he-
res-why-the-biggest-unicorns-in-the-world-are-taking-on-billions-in-debt [https://
perma.unl.edu/AJA8-5C93].
181. Many start-ups have lower capital requirements than companies in the old indus-
trial economy. GIOVANNETTI, supra note 132, at 13. But see Farhad Manjoo, The
Rise of the Fat Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2017, at B1, https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/05/24/technology/opendoor-start-up-home-sales.html (discussing re-
cent capital-intensive startups that have raised substantial funds).
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tal-intensive industry in which plant and payroll required enormous
outlay. In contrast, Uber, with a 2017 valuation close to $70 billion,182
employs approximately 6700 people.183 As of March 1, 2017,
Facebook’s market capitalization was $397 billion,184 and in 2016 it
employed approximately 17,000 people.185 Snap, Inc., parent company
of Snapchat, ended its first day of public trading on March 2, 2017,
with a market capitalization of $28.4 billion.186 Snap tripled its
workforce in 2016, bringing it up to 1859 full-time employees.187
In many cases, today’s startups can reduce their capital require-
ments by outsourcing their needs as they arise, rather than raising
capital in order to build it. So, for example, if FedEx provides logistics,
young businesses need not develop that capacity in order to start oper-
ating.188 Although the extent may be difficult to quantify, it seems
obvious that widespread information technology is a key to lowering
initial capital requirements. Uber and Airbnb represent extreme ex-
amples, in which the capital (e.g., vehicles, bedrooms) traditionally
owned by the seller (e.g., cab company, hotel) is owned by the user of
the service, as if customers were told to build their own factory.
182. From Zero to Seventy (Billion), ECONOMIST (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.economist
.com/news/briefing/21706249-accelerated-life-and-times-worlds-most-valuable-
startup-zero-seventy [http://perma.unl.edu/MTH2-PVVV] (noting that Uber’s val-
uation is more than a third higher than that of General Motors, which had $152
billion in sales in 2015).
183. Connie Loizos, Handcuffed to Uber, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 29, 2016), https://tech-
crunch.com/2016/04/29/handcuffed-to-uber [https://perma.unl.edu/XUQ9-XWVS].
184. Facebook, Inc. (FB), YAHOO! FIN., http://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FB?ltr=1
[https://perma.unl.edu/872K-2J5Z].
185. Number of Facebook Employees from 2004 to 2016 (full-time), STATISTA, https://
www.statista.com/statistics/273563/number-of-facebook-employees [https://per
ma.unl.edu/TLM4-ECXY].
186. Caitlin Huston, Snap’s Market Cap Surpasses Twitter, Hershey, MARKETWATCH
(Mar. 3, 2017), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/snaps-market-cap-has-sur-
passed-twitter-hershey-2017-03-02. Snap’s IPO raises interesting questions for
the thesis of this Article. It obviously was not motivated by a need for capital.
And since the shares offered do not contain voting rights, Snap is not subject to
the discipline provided by the market for corporate control. The offering appears
to have been an effort to receive even more from public investors than the com-
pany was able to obtain from private investors. It is also worth noting that Snap
has yet to make a profit; that is, financing is its revenue stream.
187. Todd Spangler, Snapchat IPO: Share Pricing Values Company at Up to $22 Bil-
lion, VARIETY (Feb. 16, 2017), http://variety.com/2017/digital/news/snapchat-
snap-ipo-share-pricing-valuation-1201990058 [https://perma.unl.edu/8RD6-
8FHX].
188. See, e.g., Global Order Logistics, FEDEX, http://ftn.fedex.com/us/services/gol.shtml
[https://perma.unl.edu/H3TN-CY6E].
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D. Requiem for the Public Equity Market?
The idea that private markets could serve the functions of public
markets seemed unlikely before the Global Financial Crisis.189 As dis-
cussed in the next Part, despite the surge of the private markets, it
would be foolish to think that the public markets are not still vitally
important to American society. Nevertheless, their role and, so, mean-
ing appears to be in transition. Bloomberg journalist Matt Levine
summarizes it thus: “Private markets are the new public markets, and
massive multinational companies with 11-digit valuations can raise
billions of dollars from institutional and retail investors without the
formality of going public.”190 From this, he concludes: “The main func-
tion of public markets these days is not for companies to raise money,
but for them to return money to shareholders.”191 Or, one might add,
to give shareholders, especially institutional guardians on which indi-
viduals and institutions depend, ways to store value and perhaps grow
some wealth.
IV. THE CONTEMPORARY PUBLIC EQUITY MARKETS
A. Introduction
As mentioned above, the public equity market still plays vital roles
in the U.S. economy and will continue to do so for the foreseeable fu-
ture. True, the private equity market increasingly dominates the fi-
nancing of new enterprises that used to be the hallmark of the NYSE
and NASDAQ. It is also true that the private equity market is larger
189. See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization
of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1057, 1066–67 (2009) (proposing a
“thought experiment, imagining the emergence of deep, liquid trading markets
for corporate securities in the United States that are entirely wholesale” but con-
cluding that the creation of such a market was “politically and normatively un-
sustainable”). In fairness, Langevoort went on to imagine the substantial
expansion of Rule 144A qualified institutional buyer trading so that a liquid sec-
ondary private market emerged. While the Rule 144A market has expanded, li-
quidity remains an issue in the private market, somewhat addressed by stock
buybacks. So, one might say, what was in 2009 an infeasible thought experiment
has not entirely been achieved in 2017. See also Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem
for the Retail Investor?, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1116 (2009) (questioning whether
such a market would in fact be a good idea, even for investors, but ultimately
agreeing with Langevoort that such a market was politically and practically in-
feasible). In the same vein, Jesse Fried and Charles Wang have recently noted
that smaller firms still use the public equity markets to raise capital. Jesse M.
Fried & Charles C.Y. Wang, Short-Termism and Capital Flows (Harvard Bus.
Sch. Accounting & Mgmt. Unit, Working Paper No. 17-062, 2017), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=2895161.
190. Matt Levine, Unicorn Buybacks and Securities Law, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 16,
2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-16/unicorn-buybacks-
and-securities-law [https://perma.unl.edu/GA7Y-GHJH].
191. Id.
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than the public market. Currently, more stocks are held privately,
among the wealthy and institutions, than publicly, among the broad
middle class. That said, great corporations have long been financed in
large part through the issuance of stock to the public. Many such com-
panies remain in business, and their stock trades publicly. Consider
American Express, Boeing, and Coca-Cola. Such stocks figure as the
backbone of portfolios of great social significance.
The public equity market, however has been transformed. As dis-
cussed below, institutional investors have recently come to dominate
public stock holdings. Indeed, a substantial portion of the public eq-
uity market is owned by a handful of firms: Blackrock, Vanguard, Fi-
delity, and State Street, each of which has trillions of dollars of assets
under management. Conversely, direct individual-investor participa-
tion in the stock market has declined precipitously. Even indirect par-
ticipation (through funds) has declined.
Securities law’s focus on the retail investor and corporation law’s
concern for the individual shareholder both presume the corporation,
and by extension the stock market, is relatively powerless and at the
mercy of centralized management.192 That was once a fairly accurate
picture, although the degree to which shareholders or management
had the upper hand was contested for decades. Regardless, in the con-
temporary public company, that description of corporations and the
markets for their stock is no longer accurate. Today’s company manag-
ers tend to report to a small number of significant owners.
There is burgeoning concern regarding what the concentration of
public company ownership might mean. Most of this concern focuses
on the corporate-governance and competition issues raised by concen-
trated ownership, which certainly deserve consideration. For present
purposes, however, the fact of concentration—uncontested in this
literature—is significant per se. A handful of owners dominate the na-
tion’s most important companies; even the so-called public markets
are not all that public anymore.
B. Rise of the Institutional Investor
Over the last few generations, the percentage of shares held by in-
stitutions as opposed to individuals has increased.193 The rise of the
institutional investor has happened in plain sight and has hardly
192. See supra Part I (detailing Berle and Means’s explanation of the separation of
ownership and control in the corporate form).
193. Rick Fleming, the SEC’s Investor Advocate, highlighted the steady decline in the
number of individuals directly owning stock since the 1970s in a talk before the
North American Securities Administrators Association in May 2017. Tom Zanki,
SEC Chair Faces Uphill Climb in Reviving IPO Market, LAW360 (May 17, 2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/925181/sec-chair-faces-uphill-climb-in-reviving-
ipo-market. Mr. Fleming noted that fewer retail investors in IPOs corresponds to
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passed unnoticed. Extensive institutional-investor shareholding, how-
ever, is not merely quantitatively noteworthy. At some point, a market
dominated by institutional decisions about whether to hold or sell
large blocks of shares is qualitatively different from a market mostly
comprising retail investors. And, as discussed below, there have been
important shifts in the nature of institutional investing. Most impor-
tantly, there has been a shift from actively to passively managed
funds.
It may be useful to put this evolution in some chronological con-
text. During the bull market of the 1990s, driven both by excitement
over Silicon Valley and the changes from defined benefit pension plans
to defined contribution retirement plans such as IRAs and 401(k)s,
money poured into the stock market and especially into mutual funds.
The resultant growth proved transformative: institutional investors
soon began to look like the dominant force in the equity market. The
significance of such dominance for corporate governance and espe-
cially shareholder voice was debated.194
By the late 2000s, the stock market was controlled by institutional
investors, especially mutual funds. As one scholar noted in 2008:
Since the mid-1990s, a small handful of mutual funds—not public or private
pension funds—have become the most significant large-scale corporate own-
ers, due in large part to their management of 401k (personal pension) plans
and the growth of retail investment. As a group, mutual funds hold almost
30% of US corporate ownership today, compared with 8% in 1990.195
At least to some, the dominance of mutual funds seemed to constitute
a new form of finance capitalism, importantly different from the bank-
driven finance capitalism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.196
In 2013, in a public speech at Georgia State University, SEC Com-
missioner Louis Aguilar said:
[T]he proportion of U.S. public equities managed by institutions has risen
steadily over the past six decades, from about 7 or 8% of market capitalization
in 1950, to about 67% in 2010. . . .
a heavier reliance on institutional investors. This, in turn, may lead to fewer
IPOs because institutional investors may avoid smaller companies. Id.
194. In an early piece on the importance of institutional investing, published in 1992,
Bernard Black hoped that the emergence of institutional investors might address
certain shareholder-governance issues. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching
Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992).
195. See Davis, supra note 124, at 12; see also Langevoort, supra note 189 (presuming
that his audience understood that institutional investors dominated the equity
market and using that fact as the occasion for an inquiry into the future of the
SEC).
196. See Davis, supra note 124.
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Institutional investor ownership is an even more significant factor in the
largest corporations: In 2009, institutional investors owned in the aggregate
73% of the outstanding equity in the 1,000 largest U.S. corporations.197
In 2014, Andrew Haldane, the Bank of England’s Executive Direc-
tor, Financial Stability, gave a talk at the London School of Econom-
ics, inquiring into the possibility of systemic risk posed by the
burgeoning asset-management industry, and noted that “[i]n the
United States, AUM [assets under management] have risen almost
fivefold relative to GDP since 1946, from around 50% of GDP to
around 240% of GDP.”198 AUM is not synonymous with institutional
investors, much less with mutual funds. By the same token, not all of
the assets in question are equities. Nonetheless, Haldane’s numbers
give a sense of how the capital markets, including the equity market,
have been transformed.
Nor have such trends shown any sign of slowing. For example,
Blackrock, the world’s largest asset manager, had over four trillion
dollars under management when Haldane gave his speech in April
2014. The firm had over five trillion dollars under management in late
2016. With regard to the U.S. public equity markets, the conventional
estimation (which is already a bit dated) is that seventy to eighty per-
cent of shares publicly traded in the United States are held by institu-
tional investors.199
C. The Shift from Actively Managed to Passively Managed
Funds
In 1973, Burton Malkiel published A Random Walk Down Wall
Street, which popularized the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH).200
Malkiel explained EMH in a way that has become conventional, with
the empirically verifiable fact that most money managers do not beat
197. Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Institutional Investors: Power &
Responsibility (Apr. 19, 2013) (citing Marshall E. Blume & Donald B. Keim, Insti-
tutional Investors and Stock Market Liquidity: Trends and Relationships 4 (Aug.
21, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/down
load?doi=10.1.1.248.6596&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8GM4-
CAE7]), https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515808#P18_
1663 [https://perma.unl.edu/4S6A-YQB3]; see MATTEO TONNELLO & STEPHAN
RABIMOV, THE 2010 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTMENT REPORT: TRENDS IN ASSET ALLO-
CATION AND PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION (2010), https://www.conference-board.org/
publications/publicationdetail.cfm?publicationid=1872&centerId=5.
198. Andrew Haldane, Exec. Dir., Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech at the London
Business School: The Age of Asset Management (Apr. 4, 2014), http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2014/speech723.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/472Y-7XBZ].
199. Kristian Rydqvist et al., Government Policy and Ownership of Equity Securities,
111 J. FIN. ECON. 70, 70–85 (2014).
200. BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED
STRATEGY FOR SUCCESSFUL INVESTING (2015).
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the market average consistently, particularly not when fees and ex-
penses of money management are taken into account.201 In 2009, Pro-
fessor Donald Langevoort noted: “A recent study suggests that about
24% of funds have negative alpha (poor stock picking ability), while
the other 76% have a positive alpha—however, for all but a tiny frac-
tion of these, the positive return is less than fees and expenses, often
by a significant amount.”202 Of course, in considering Malkiel’s claim,
one must stress most and consistently. Berkshire Hathaway has
beaten the market quite handily since 1965, a feat for which Warren
Buffett has become famous.203 What the customary difficulty of beat-
ing the market means for political economy has been contested for
over a generation now, and a discussion is quite beyond the scope of
this Article.204 But the fact of widespread active-management un-
derperformance has meant a lot for the financial industries, especially
in the last decade, during which we have seen the rise of the passively
managed index fund.
In 1975, John “Jack” Bogle founded Vanguard, widely acknowl-
edged to be the first index fund. The firm’s business model was based
on thinking done for Bogle’s thesis at Princeton, an article by Nobel
laureate Paul Samuelson arguing that there was no rigorous evidence
for the performance of money managers (like Bogle) and an odd busi-
ness situation. In the course of a messy merger and subsequent reor-
ganization, Bogle agreed not to manage money. Vanguard, Bogle
successfully maintained, would not be “managed”: it would simply buy
and hold stocks in proportion to market indices.205 As of December 31,
2016, Vanguard had global assets under management worth over four
trillion dollars.206 The firm brings in roughly one billion dollars a day
in new money.207
The fundamental thinking behind index trading is simple, what
Bogle calls “humble arithmetic.”208 Consider passive investing first.
Money invested across a diversified pool should earn a positive return
201. Id. at 287–88.
202. Langevoort, supra note 189, at 1051 (citing Laurent Barras et al., False Discover-
ies in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas 2 (Swiss
Fin. Inst., Research Paper No. RHS-06-043, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=8697
48).
203. See Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Bd., to
S’holders (Feb. 25, 2017), http://berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2016ltr.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/R4MX-JB5F].
204. See generally DAVID A. WESTBROOK, CITY OF GOLD: AN APOLOGY FOR GLOBAL CAPI-
TALISM IN A TIME OF DISCONTENT (2004); DAVID A. WESTBROOK, OUT OF CRISIS:
RETHINKING OUR FINANCIAL MARKETS (2010).
205. Regan, supra note 88.
206. Fast Facts About Vanguard, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguard.com/who-we-are/
fast-facts [https://perma.unl.edu/34XE-BATS].
207. See Regan, supra note 88.
208. Id.
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and over time almost invariably does. Stock price appreciation re-
quires no attention; dividends can be reinvested rather automatically.
The original investment thus compounds. In contrast, active manage-
ment costs in two ways: the fees associated with trading and the
agency costs of hiring smart analysts to figure out what and when to
trade.  Such costs are simply lost and do not compound. Thus, over
time, seemingly insignificant cost differentials can lead to enormous
differences in total return.
Vanguard is only the second largest of the passive asset managers,
although it runs the largest single mutual fund. Blackrock has over
five trillion dollars in assets under management, most of which are
passively invested.209 Money has been flowing from active into pas-
sive funds for years.210
In an influential 2016 study, Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk,
and Javier Garcia-Bernardo examined the collective holdings of what
they call “the Big Three” passive investing firms: BlackRock, Van-
guard, and State Street. They found “that already in 40 percent of all
listed U.S. corporations the Big Three together constitute the largest
shareholder—and even in 88 percent of the S&P 500 firms.”211 The
firms in which the Big Three are not collectively the largest share-
holder tend to be dominated by their founders (e.g., Alphabet/Google
(Larry Page and Sergey Brin), Amazon (Jeff Bezos), and Berkshire
Hathaway (Warren Buffett)).212 Even individually, the Big Three
funds own huge stakes. Vanguard alone, for example, owns at least
five percent of ninety-four percent of the S&P 500.213 In sum, “we wit-
209. Sarah Krouse & Austen Hufford, BlackRock Assets Pass $5 Trillion as Earnings
Climb, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/blackrock-earn-
ings-rise-as-assets-under-management-peak-1476788361.
210. See, e.g., Madison Marriage, Passive Funds Take Third of U.S. Market, FIN.
TIMES (Sept. 11, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/4cdf2f88-7695-11e6-b60a-
de4532d5ea35 (reporting on pressure on active fund managers by the fast-grow-
ing passive investment industry); Julie Verhage, These Charts Show the Astound-
ing Rise in Passive Management, MONEYWEB (Dec. 31, 2015), https://www
.moneyweb.co.za/news/international/these-charts-show-the-astounding-rise-in-
passive-management [https://perma.unl.edu/BK4U-4X4B] (providing tabular
data showing a rise in passive funds and a decline in active funds between 2008
and 2015).
211. Jan Fichtner, Eelke M. Heemskerk & Javier Garcia-Bernardo, Hidden Power of
the Big Three? Passive Index Funds, Re-Concentration of Corporate Ownership,
and New Financial Risk 24 (May 15, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2798653.
212. Id. at 15.
213. Sarah Krouse et al., Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive Investors,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-
power-brokers-passive-investors-1477320101 (“Vanguard’s U.S.-based passive
funds owned 5% or more of only three S&P 500 companies at the end of 2005. By
the end of June this year, that number had rocketed to 468 companies, or about
94%, according to the Journal analysis.”).
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ness a concentration of corporate ownership not seen since the days of
J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller.”214
The concentration of ownership in a few funds is compounded by
the concentration of attention within firms. Passive investing is de-
signed to be low cost and therefore employs relatively few people. As a
result, very few people concern themselves with corporate governance.
A 2016 Wall Street Journal article reported:
Vanguard has 15 people overseeing work on about 13,000 companies based
around the world. BlackRock has about two dozen people who work on govern-
ance issues at some 14,000 companies held in its index funds and exchange-
traded funds, and it plans to add seven more in the coming months, according
to a spokesman.
Boston-based State Street Global Advisors, another large passive fund
manager, part of State Street, has fewer than 10 employees devoted to issues
at around 9,000 companies and uses a number of automated filters to identify
companies on which to focus each year.215
Different views of what such concentration might mean are intro-
duced in the following section. For present purposes, the key insight is
that small numbers of people are in a position to wield decisive power
over the corporations that dominate the United States and, to a large
extent, the global economy. As Bogle said some years ago, “For God’s
sake, don’t you know that we are Adam Smith’s invisible hand?”216
D. Possible Consequences of Institutional-Investor
Dominance
Such concentrations of wealth beg comparison with the Gilded Age.
In A New Finance Capitalism, Gerald Davis compared the first fi-
nance capitalism in the United States, the concentration of corporate
ownership in the robber barons, with the finance capitalism that
emerges when institutional investors—at the time (2008), Fidelity
and other mutual funds—own dominant positions. “On any given day,
the Fidelity mutual fund family is the single largest shareholder of
roughly 10% of corporate America, and no other entity comes
close. . . . This is a concentration of corporate ownership in a few
hands not seen since the early days of finance capitalism.”217 Davis,
however, also saw important differences:
But it is also clear that Fidelity is not JP Morgan. There is no latter-day
Brandeis or Hilferding decrying the power of financial oligarchs; if anything,
commentators chastise Fidelity for failing to exercise its potential for corpo-
214. Fichtner et al., supra note 211, at 17.
215. Krouse et al., supra note 213.
216. Barbara Kiviat, 10 Questions for John Bogle, TIME (Sept. 4, 2005), http://con-
tent.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101310,00.html.
217. Davis, supra note 124, at 12.
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rate control, and for remaining overly passive in the face of widespread corpo-
rate scandals.218
More recently, as the concentration of ownership has increased,
concerns have indeed arisen. In 2016, in their paper Anti-Competitive
Effects of Common Ownership, Jose´ Azar, Martin C. Schmalz, and Isa-
bel Tecu argued that cross-ownership of airlines and banks leads to
lessening of competition and therefore to higher prices.219 Also in
2016, Einer Elhauge maintained more generally that “[a] small group
of institutions has acquired large shareholdings in horizontal competi-
tors throughout our economy, causing them to compete less vigorously
with each other.”220 He went on to argue that horizontal shareholding
helps explain many of the puzzles of corporation law, notably execu-
tive compensation, and urges enforcement under the antitrust laws.
If true, it is unclear how to combat such anticompetitive effects. In
their forthcoming article, A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive
Power of Institutional Investors, Eric A. Posner, Fiona Scott Morton,
and E. Glen Weyl build on Azar, Schmalz, and Tecu and deploy the
tradition of antitrust in both its legal and economic expressions.221
They argue that the Federal Trade Commission and the Department
of Justice should enforce the Clayton Act to create a safe harbor, effec-
tively requiring that investors in oligopolistic industries (like airlines)
either limit the size of their holdings in the industry to some de mini-
mus level or choose a single competitor in which to invest.222
Restraint of trade is hardly the worst thing of which index funds
have been accused. In 2016, the research and brokerage firm Sanford
Bernstein and Co. issued a now-notorious note, “The Silent Road to
Serfdom: Why Passive Investing is Worse Than Marxism,”223 arguing
in part that stock markets depended on research and, by definition,
index funds do not do research. Malkiel was moved to respond in the
Wall Street Journal and among other things flatly denied the possibil-
218. Id.
219. Jose´ Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu, Anti-Competitive Effects of Common
Ownership, J. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 30), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?rec=1&pos=1&abstract_id=2427345&srcabs=2524368&alg=1.
220. Einer Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2016).
221. Eric A. Posner, Fiona M. Scott Morton & E. Glen Weyl, A Proposal to Limit the
Anti-Competitive Power of Institutional Investors, ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2872754. Posner, Morton,
and Weyl go back to Rockefeller in their analysis. See id.
222. For an insightful overview of the impact of index funds on competition, see Frank
Partnoy, Are Index Funds Evil?, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017) https://www.theatlantic
.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/are-index-funds-evil/534183 [https://perma.unl
.edu/F995-T2D6].
223. Luke Kawa, Bernstein: Passive Investing Is Worse for Society than Marxism; At
Least It’s an Ethos, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-08-23/bernstein-passive-investing-is-worse-for-society-than-
marxism [https://perma.unl.edu/2DL2-2LB2].
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ity that new information would not be priced in.224 Bogle was even
more skeptical of the idea that passive funds are the end of capitalism.
As quoted above, Bogle argued that stock market prices simply do not
matter very much for asset allocation in the real economy.225
Whatever the indirect importance of the secondary market for publicly
traded stocks for capital allocation in the real economy, the traditional
role of equity in financing entrepreneurial innovation appears to now
be played by the private equity market, as discussed in Part III. War-
ren Buffett has even emerged as a fan of index funds, discussing them
at length in his latest annual letter.226
Some years ago, as worries about passive ownership began to
emerge, institutional investors seemed to be well situated to address
the traditional concern that management would take advantage of rel-
atively powerless small shareholders, the problem expressed by Berle
and Means. After all, institutional investors, with their large block
holdings, had both vested interest in the fortunes of the companies
they held and effective voice. Moreover, some activist institutional in-
vestors existed, notably CalPERS. Legal scholars, notably Bernard S.
Black in his seminal 1992 article Agents Watching Agents,227 there-
fore looked to institutional investors to discipline corporations.228
Since then, the promise of institutional shareholding to improve
corporate governance has turned out to be rather limited.229 The hope
that institutional investors, themselves intermediaries investing pub-
lic funds, would monitor corporate managers did not fully material-
ize.230 The reasons were various. Collective-action problems
abounded.231 Institutional investors generally sided with manage-
224. Burton G. Makiel, Is Indexing Worse than Marxism?, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/is-indexing-worse-than-marxism-1479857852.
225. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
226. See Buffett, supra note 203, at 24 (“Over the years, I’ve often been asked for in-
vestment advice, and in the process of answering I’ve learned a good deal about
human behavior. My regular recommendation has been a low-cost S&P 500 index
fund. To their credit, my friends who possess only modest means have usually
followed my suggestion.”). See generally id. at 21–25.
227. Black, supra note 194.
228. Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 10 (1991).
229. John C. Coffee, Jr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report,
15 CARDOZO L. REV. 837 (1994); Robert C. Illig, What Hedge Funds Can Teach
Corporate America: A Roadmap for Achieving Institutional Investor Oversight, 57
AM. U. L. REV. 225 (2007) (arguing that hedge funds and private equity funds are
engaging in more aggressive monitoring if corporations than “relentlessly pas-
sive” mutual funds and public pension funds); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445
(1991).
230. Sharon Hannes, Super Hedge Fund, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 163, 171–72 (2015) (com-
menting on Black, supra note 194).
231. Id. at 172.
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ment. When unhappy, such investors, particularly Fidelity, preferred
to exit their position by selling their stock rather than expending time
and attention on corporate governance.232 Moreover, some activist in-
vestors (not necessarily institutional investors) used their large blocks
of shares to force management to deliver proceeds of the business to
shareholders, often through stock buybacks and often raising accusa-
tions of short-termism. Whether or not, or in what circumstances, forc-
ing companies to return money to shareholders constitutes good
corporate governance remains contested.
As already suggested, the relatively recent emergence of passive
index funds has changed the discussion of the significance of institu-
tional investors. In the ordinary course, index funds cannot sell; they
do not even have discretion over what to buy. Index funds are legally
committed to maintaining a portfolio that mirrors the composition of
some preexisting index (even if the index is itself ad hoc, custom, or
proprietary). Thus, for Vanguard, unlike Fidelity, exit is not an option.
What this means in practice is unclear, or perhaps merely variable.
One view is that because funds cannot exit their positions, they
must exercise their voices. “ ‘We’re riding in a car we can’t get out of,’
said Vanguard’s Mr. Booraem. ‘Governance is the seat belt and air
bag.’”233 In the same vein, Fichtner maintains that:
In contrast to active funds, the Big Three hold illiquid and permanent owner-
ship positions, which gives them stronger incentives to actively influence cor-
porations. We find that they indeed utilize coordinated voting strategies but
generally vote with management, except at director (re)elections.234
On the other hand, if horizontal ownership really does blunt com-
petition, one might imagine that few occasions require the Big Three
funds to raise their voices. Owners diversified across an industry
might care very little about which firm within the industry did better
or worse. And, as noted above, index funds simply do not have the
staff to pay much attention to corporate governance. The head of cor-
porate governance for State Street’s asset management funds goes so
far as to tell her team to “not to take every meeting” with company
executives,235 neatly mirroring the Berle and Means image of the
manager who does not care about individual shareholders.
As Fichtner suggests above, index funds tend to vote with manage-
ment. But even this may be misleading. Surely managers generally
have some idea of the interests of their dominant shareholders and
have little incentive to make proposals with which index funds are
likely to disagree. Moreover, index funds appear to “engage” with
management behind the scenes with some regularity, especially with
232. Davis, supra note 124, at 20.
233. Krouse et al., supra note 213 (quoting Glenn Booraem, a principal at Vanguard).
234. Fichtner et al., supra note 211, at 1.
235. Krouse et al., supra note 213.
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funds identified as requiring attention.236 For their part, understand-
ably, “passive houses insist they care about governance.”237
Debates over the roles index funds play in the governance of corpo-
rations, to say nothing of the allocation of capital in the economy, are
likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It seems unlikely that
general, abstract answers will be forthcoming. For present purposes,
however, these debates need not be resolved. It is enough to note how
the shift of effective ownership of U.S. public companies to institu-
tional investors, and in particular to giant index funds, is now
presumed.
E. Guardians
As the mutual fund industry took off in the 1980s and 1990s, there
was much talk of the democratization of capitalism in general and
stock markets in particular. Funds gave people of even modest means
the chance to participate in financial markets hitherto closed to them.
Echoes of this democratic enthusiasm may still be heard today, for
example, in calls to expand the market for passive funds and ex-
change-traded funds (ETFs) in Europe.238
Finance has indeed been democratized, if all that one means by
“democracy” is the participation of the people at large. The U.S. econ-
omy has been financed to a depth that is difficult to fathom; one may
speak of “social capitalism.”239 It is not just that key social functions,
such as education, health care (especially through insurance), and re-
tirement are provided by institutions largely founded on endowments
or that the value of assets under management is 240% of GDP. Fi-
nance, and thus capital markets, is required for the daily operation of
the real economy. In that sense, everyone participates. Even those not
invested in the stock market at all.
But one is driven to ask, what kind of participation? Certainly not
participation as an investor. As noted above, less than fifty percent of
236. Fichtner et al., supra note 211.
237. Madison Marriage, Passive Houses Insist They Do Care About Governance, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/bd77d9b8-dd9f-11e6-86ac-f253
db7791c6.
238. See, e.g., Judith Evans & Jonathan Eley, Democratising Finance: How Passive
Funds Changed Investing, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.ft.com/con-
tent/b3c0c960-a56c-11e4-bf11-00144feab7de.
239. See David A. Westbrook, Problematique, RETHINKING FIN. MKTS., http://rfconfer-
ence2012.weaconferences.net/problematique [https://perma.unl.edu/Q9M4-
P6NQ]; see also David A. Westbrook, Dinner Parties During “Lost Decades”: On
the Difficulties of Rethinking Financial Markets, Fostering Elite Consensus, and
Renewing Political Economy, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1187, 1213 (2013) (discussing
the vital importance of finance, especially endowments and credit markets, to
daily operations of what is still erroneously thought of as the nonfinancial or
“real” economy, including households).
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Americans are invested in the stock market, even indirectly. Moreo-
ver, stock market holdings are highly skewed towards the very
wealthy. In 2014, 93% of families earning income in the top ten per-
cent in the United States owned stock, either directly or indirectly.240
In contrast, only 11.4% of families in the lowest twenty percent of U.S.
income were invested.241
The equity markets are also undemocratic in another way: with
the rise of the institutional investor and the corresponding decline of
the retail investor, very few “owners” have any significant form of
agency. They literally cannot vote, and so it is hard to see their partici-
pation in the markets as democratic. Perhaps this does not matter
much. After all, investors in the Snapchat IPO242 do not even get a
nominal right to vote. Since the IPO was oversubscribed, evidently a
lot of people do not care about voting.
But voting (or not) matters to the stories told about what the stock
market means and, by extension, to political economy. It is a common-
place that fund managers are fiduciaries for their clients, but it is
worth remembering that fiduciary duty has its roots in the law of
trusts. The trustee has legal ownership in order to serve as a guardian
of the beneficiary’s interest. The beneficiary is not presumed to have
autonomy and may be a child or otherwise incompetent. Just as the
beneficiary relies on the integrity of the trustee, the average investor
relies on her guardian not only to manage her funds but also to over-
see the conduct of the large corporations on whose future long-term
expectations depend.
V. CONCLUSION
The regime that has recently emerged in the U.S. equity markets
has much to recommend it. Most people do not have the time, interest,
or capacity to decide which broadly available investment opportunities
warrant actual investment and, more to the point, would help secure
their future over decades. The extent to which the venture capital
community has such capacity is not the subject of this Article. At least
in principle, the allocation of financing to entrepreneurs, especially
start-ups, might properly be assigned to an elite playing largely with
its own money.
240. Cf. Zumbrun, supra note 120 (arguing, however, that despite the trend toward
stock ownership dominance by the wealthy, many middle-class families also hold
stocks).
241. Id.
242. Snap, Inc., parent company of Snapchat, engaged in its long-awaited IPO on
March 2, 2017. Anita Balakrishnan, Snap Closes Up 44% After Rollicking IPO,
CNBC (Mar. 2, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/02/snapchat-snap-open-trad-
ing-price-stock-ipo-first-day.html [https://perma.unl.edu/G7FT-BD7D].
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Those things said, moving to a regime of well-funded unicorns, new
ventures financed by wealthy individuals and funds, and anointed
guardians trusted by the masses has profound consequences. It is dif-
ficult to see this new regime in anything like the ideological terms
that animated stockholding throughout the twentieth century. This is
not republican capitalism because power is too concentrated. This is
not democratic capitalism because almost nobody has a vote. This is
not middle-class capitalism because the middle class, in any mathe-
matical sense, is only tangentially involved. In short, our just so sto-
ries about the markets are no longer just so. The public and private
equity markets do not fit within our perceived understandings of what
stock markets are and what social roles they perform. Nor do these
markets resemble the environment in which the laws and regulations
crafted to govern them were drafted.
None of which need be the end of the world. Stock markets, evi-
dently, can evolve. If our equity markets are increasingly less middle
class, increasingly concentrated, then perhaps it is time to conceive of
them in somewhat neofeudal terms. In that case, the new question
arises: “[W]hat are the obligations incumbent upon our guardians and
how are such obligations enforced?”243
But perhaps not. Concern about social structures that might be pe-
joratively termed medieval is hardly new in U.S. history. As a young
nation, the United States defined itself against the aristocracy of old
Europe, and the Constitution banned titles of nobility.244 In the
1930s, Berle and Means were concerned with very large, broadly
owned corporations with centralized managers who would become de
facto princes. In their discussion of AT&T, they noted that one hun-
dred companies on the scale of AT&T would own all of the private
wealth in the United States.245 Virtually everyone would be a share-
holder. But the assets of the companies (i.e., of the nation) would be
controlled by very few managers. In that scenario, the economy of the
nation would be deeply undemocratic and unaccountable. If the nation
itself did not want to be ruled by such undemocratic powers (hardly a
trivial issue in the 1930s or today), some way had to be found to make
management more accountable to the democratic republic.
Berle and Means hoped that corporation law would play a central
role in this essentially political task. As argued above, insofar as law
has fulfilled this function, it has done so more through federal securi-
ties law than through state corporation law. Federal securities law,
however, applied to the large publicly traded and widely held corpora-
243. David A. Westbrook, The Culture of Financial Institutions: The Institution of Po-
litical Economy, in REGULATING CULTURE: INTEGRITY, RISK AND ACCOUNTABILITY
IN CAPITAL MARKETS 3 (Justin O’Brien & George Gilligan eds., 2013).
244. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8.
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tions. The political function of securities law depended on the central-
ity of a certain kind of corporation that sought capital in the public
markets, which, in turn, presumed that society’s surplus capital was
held by a dispersed middle class. In short, the power of the great cor-
porations was somewhat tamed, subjected to legal restraints, within a
particular socioeconomic matrix.
Recent years have seen developments that have all but destroyed
this matrix. On the one hand, wealth has concentrated and private
equity markets have emerged that serve as alternatives to the public
equity market. At the same time, the public equity market has become
dominated by highly concentrated shareholding in the form of institu-
tional investors, especially index funds, and the occasional founder.
Both developments have resulted in concentrations of capital that
mirror the concentration of management that concerned Berle and
Means. For Berle and Means, the concern was concentrated manage-
ment and dispersed ownership. The concern now is that both manage-
ment and ownership are concentrated in the hands of very few people.
In theory, the law could work to foster more inclusive forms of eq-
uity capitalism. Recall the argument that, for the bulk of the twenti-
eth century, the quid pro quo for raising large amounts of capital, then
presumed to be held by large numbers of citizens, was submission to
the mandatory-disclosure regime of the federal securities laws. Since
then, concentration of private wealth has come to mean that public
offerings are generally no longer necessary, and in such cases, public
disclosure is often no longer necessary.
If concentrations of wealth make the public markets avoidable,
then breaking up concentrations of wealth might force companies to
make public offerings. In compliance with the securities laws, manag-
ers of those companies might have to become the sort of business peo-
ple that we want running our utilities. For example, a tax on assets,
by analogy to the income tax, could be used to disaggregate private
fortunes. Similar things might be encouraged with a higher, or more
broadly applicable, inheritance tax, perhaps with a hefty exemption
for charitable giving.
Or the expansive notion of private offering enunciated in Regula-
tion D246 could be revised so that venture capital, private equity, and
any number of interfirm financings would have to be disclosed. By the
same token, the JOBS Act247 could be recalled or revised so that firms
with some relatively low number of shareholders (five hundred was
the old number) would be forced to file company data with the SEC
and, as a practical matter, would list publicly. The law might simply
246. See Bratton, supra note 5.
247. Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat.
306.
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require public disclosure for financings of a certain size, say $500 mil-
lion, regardless of the number or identity of the investors.
Turning to institutional investors, the law could cap the size of
funds. As noted above, the law might limit horizontal shareholding or
require funds that held a certain percentage of interest in a given firm
to devote significant resources to the management and oversight of
that firm. No doubt there are other approaches, but none of this is
conceptually difficult and would not even be particularly radical, at
least in comparison with laws passed when what was once unblush-
ingly called the free enterprise system was thought to be endangered.
In principle, we could adopt laws that would constitute a new, more
republican, regime. Or—we can sit back and watch.
